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Abstract
This thesis studies the optimal income tax scheme in four different settings. Chapter
1 focuses on the implications of lack of commitment for the optimal labor and cap-
ital income tax rates. It finds that it is optimal to converge to zero capital income
taxes and positive labor income taxes in the long run. The government will follow
the optimal plan as long as its debt is low enough, which implies that the lack of
commitment may lead to some asset accumulation in the short run. Chapter 2 deter-
mines the optimal tax schedule when education is endogenous and observable, in a
setting where agents have heterogeneous abilities. It finds that, for each ability level,
it is optimal to subsidize monetary educational costs at the same marginal rate at
which income is being taxed. Chapter 3 finds that when entrepreneurial labor income
cannot be observed separately from capital income, then it is optimal to have positive
capital taxation in the long run. Chapter 4 finds that if human capital expenses are
unobservable, then in the optimal plan human capital accumulation will be distorted
in the long run.
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Chapter 1
Taxation without Commitment
This chapter considers a Ramsey model of linear capital and labor income taxation
in which a benevolent government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of taxes
for the future. In this setup, if the government is allowed to borrow and lend to the
consumers, the optimal capital income tax is zero in the long run. This result stands in
marked contrast with the recent literature on optimal taxation without commitment,
which imposes budget balance and typically finds that the optimal capital income
tax does not converge to zero. Since it is efficient to backload incentives, breaking
budget balance allows the government to generate surplus that reduces its debt or
increases its assets over time until the lack of commitment is no longer binding and
the economy is back in the full commitment solution. Therefore, while the lack of
commitment does not change the optimal capital tax in the long run, it may impose
an upper bound on the level of long run debt.
1.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the issue of optimal capital and labor income taxation when the
government cannot commit to future taxes. By allowing the government to borrow
and lend from households, the model generates results substantially different from the
ones found by the previous literature on taxation without commitment. The reason
for this is that governments with more assets need to use less distortionary taxation,
which means that the deadweight burden of additional revenue is smaller. Thus, the
incentive to default can be reduced by allowing asset accumulation.
A traditional question in the optimal taxation literature concerns the extent to
which capital taxes should be used to finance public spending. While in the short
run it is optimal to tax capital to collect costless revenue from a sunk investment,
in the long run using this source of taxation will distort the accumulation of capital.
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show that in an economy of infinitely lived agents
capital taxes lead to intertemporal distortions that compound over time, creating an
infinite wedge between marginal utility in different periods. Therefore, in the long
run, the capital income tax should asymptote to zero.
It has been believed the result of zero capital taxes in the long run critically
hinges on the ability of the government to commit ex-ante to a sequence of future
taxes. Namely, Judd (1985) says that his "results indicate that redistribution of
income through capital income taxation is effective only if it is unanticipated and
will persist only if policy-makers cannot commit themselves to low taxation in the
long run." Later work by Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) and Phelan and Stachetti
(2001) confirms this intuition by finding that when commitment binds, the long run
capital tax will not be zero. Using numerical simulations, Fernadez-Villaverde and
Tsyvinsky (2002) find that, in general, commitment will bind if the government is
impatient enough, since the future reward of a better equilibrium will not be enough
to prevent the government from deviating from the predefined plan. However, all
these papers assume that the government has to keep budget balance in each period.
This chapter shows that if instead the government is allowed to borrow and lend
to consumers, the optimal capital tax still converges to zero in the long run, as in
the full commitment case. The reason for this is that a government with a large
amount of assets will not have an incentive to default since it does not need to use
much distortionary taxation to finance its spending. Thus, governments can use asset
accumulation (or debt reduction) as a commitment device for the future. As long as
commitment binds, there will be an incentive to increase the government's assets.
This is consistent with the result found independently by Dominguez (2006), who
analyzes the model in Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) for the case where bonds are
allowed but the value of default is exogenous and depends only on capital.
Although the economy without commitment converges to a steady state where
commitment does not bind and capital income taxes are zero, some steady states
that were feasible in the economy with commitment will never be reached without
commitment. If the economy with commitment converged to a steady state with
high government debt that is no longer sustainable without commitment, then in the
economy without commitment the government will have to accumulate more assets in
the short run and will converge to a new steady state with lower debt. Hence, while
the lack of commitment does not change the optimal capital tax in the long run, it
may impose an upper bound on the long run level of debt.
A rather unexpected consequence of the lack of commitment is that capital levels
will tend to be higher in the long run when there is no commitment. This happens
because the government has to accumulate assets to overcome its commitment prob-
lem and will therefore be richer in the long run. This allows labor taxes to be lower,
which in turn increases labor supply. Higher labor will make capital more productive,
which implies that capital will also be higher in steady state.
An interesting feature of the short run dynamics is that as long as commitment
binds, capital may either be taxed or subsidized, depending on whether increasing
capital makes the commitment constraint slacker or tighter. Numerical simulations
will show an example where capital is being subsidized in the short run, so that the
capital level is higher in the economy without commitment at all times.
On a more technical side, this paper provides a setup where the worst sustainable
equilibrium can be determined in advance. Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) derive
the best policy without commitment assuming that the worst punishment is known.
Phelan and Stachetti (2001) argue that this is not always the case since the gov-
ernment's incentive constraint usually binds in the worst equilibrium, which means
that the worst punishment has to be determined endogenously. This paper provides
a sufficient condition for these two approaches to be equivalent. If the government is
allowed to make lump sum transfers to consumers, which is a common assumption
in most taxation models, then it is always credible to give the households the worst
possible expectations regarding future capital taxes, since it is incentive compatible
for the government to tax the initial sunk capital at maximal rates, given that any
remaining revenue can be redistributed to consumers as a lump sum transfer. Thus,
no incentives need to be given for the government to act according to consumers'
expectations, which means that the continuation of a worst equilibrium is still a
worst equilibrium in this model, which allows us to determine the worst sustainable
equilibrium in advance, as was assumed in Benhabib and Rustichini (1997).
We can interpret the long run results in this paper as an example of backloading
of incentives, which is also present in models of commitment in other settings, such
as Kocherlakota (1996), Ray (2002), or Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinsky (2005).
The idea is that in order to make the government's choice incentive compatible at all
points in time, it is optimal to provide rewards as far off in the future as possible, since
this provides incentives in all periods until then. Here, in particular, the backloading
of incentives is achieved by letting the government increase its assets until the lack
of commitment stops binding. This mechanism was not allowed by previous models
that imposed budget balance.
This paper is also related to the work of Klein and Rios-Rull (2002), Klein, Krusell
and Rios-Rull (2004), Klein, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2005), and Klein, Krusell and
Rios-Rull (2006), who look at time consistent Markov equilibria in taxation models.
Since Markov equilibria preclude the use of trigger strategies, the set of equilibria
that can be implemented is significantly smaller and in general a steady state with
zero capital taxes will not be optimal even if the government is allowed to break bud-
get balance. An exception to this is provided by Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte and Soares
(2006), where zero capital and labor income taxes are reached in the long run by
collecting enough capital taxes in the initial periods to finance all future government
spending. Although this paper reaches somewhat similar conclusions to ours, the
mechanism at work is not the same. In Azzimonti-Renzo, Sarte and Soares (2006),
capital accumulation occurs because in the short run capital is sunk, and it is in the
government's best interest to use non distortionary taxation to finance future spend-
ing. As a consequence, asset accumulation will not stop until the government has
enough assets to finance all future spending. Here, on the other hand, asset accu-
mulation is used to make the future without default better, so that the incentive to
default is reduced. Thus, asset accumulation stops when the incentive constraint for
the government stops binding, which happens before the government's asset limit is
reached, which means there is still positive labor taxation in the long run. Further-
more, along the transition path the predictions of the two models are significantly
different, since here capital may even be subsidized in the short run if higher capital
levels loosen the government's incentive constraint.
The game played between households and the government builds on the stream
of literature developed by Chari and Kehoe (1990) on sustainable equilibria, which
allows a more parsimonious definition of subgame perfect equilibria when some agents
are too small to behave strategically. Chari and Kehoe (1993a and 1993b) use a setup
without capital to model debt default. They allow for government default, but they
either assume that households can commit to their debt, or debt repayment cannot
be enforced at all. This paper, on the other hand, allows households to default, but
it also allows the government to punish them if they do so, which makes household
default non trivial.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 sets up the model with commitment
and derives the optimal ex-ante plan for the government. Section 1.3 relaxes the as-
sumption of commitment and characterizes the set of sustainable equilibria without
commitment. Section 1.4 derives the best sustainable equilibrium under no commit-
ment and analyses its long run properties. Section 1.5 presents a numerical example
with short run dynamics and steady state results. Section 1.6 concludes with a brief
summary of the main findings of the paper. Formal proofs are shown in the appendix
in section 1.7.
1.2 Taxation with Commitment
This section introduces the economy with commitment. It characterizes allocations
which are attainable under commitment for an arbitrary policy, which will also be
relevant when there is no commitment since, from the households' perspective, they
will be best responding to the government's strategy, which they take as given. The
benchmark Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result is also derived.
1.2.1 Model Setup
The economy has a continuum of measure one of infinitely lived identical consumers,
an arbitrary number of firms who behave competitively and a benevolent government.
Time is discrete.
Households
The households' derive utility from consumption ct, labor nt, and consumption of a
public good gt. They discount the future at rate 3, with 0 < 3 < 1, so that each
consumer's lifetime utility is given by
00S Ot [u (ct Tt) + v (gt)]
t=0
Assume u is increasing in consumption and decreasing in labor and globally con-
cave. The usual Inada conditions hold uc(0, n) = 0o, uc(oo, n) = 0, Un(c, 0) = 0 and
un(c, c0) = -oo. Assume also that the utility of the public good v is increasing and
concave with v'(0) = oo and v'(oo) = 0.
For each unit of work, households receive after tax wages of wt(1 - Tt). The labor
tax can take any real value. Households can transfer consumption between periods
using capital kt or government bonds bt. At time t - 1 households buy capital kt.
Each unit of capital costs one unit of consumption good. At time t households can
rent this capital to firms for which they receive an after tax return of Rt(1 - -tk).For
simplicity, assume that capital is fully depreciated. If capital were depreciated at
rate 6 < 1, which may be irreversible, all the results in the paper remain unchanged.
Steady state simulations will illustrate the effect of introducing irreversible capital.
Assume households can always choose not to use their capital, so that capital taxes
cannot be higher than one -tk < 1. No lower bound on tk is imposed. A bond that
pays one unit of consumption good in period t costs qt-1 units of consumption good
in period t- 1. Households may also receive lump sum transfers from the government
Tt, which must always be positive.
The households' per period budget constraint is thus given by
ct + kt+l + qtbt+l ! Rt(1 - k)k, + b, + wt(1 - rtn)nt + Tt.
They must also meet the following no Ponzi condition
lim bt+1  qs > 0.
t---oo
s=o
Government
The government is benevolent, which means that it maximizes the utility of a repre-
sentative consumer. It needs to collect revenue to finance expenditure in the public
good gt every period. It sets proportional taxes on labor --t and capital tk each
period. It transfers revenues between periods using government bonds bt. The gov-
ernment sets the bond price qt and consumers decide how many bonds to purchase.
The government can make positive lump sum transfers to the households Tt _ 0.
Given this,, the government's per period budget constraint is given by
gt + bt + Tt = wttwert + Rt kkt + qtbt+l.
Firms
Each period firms maximize profits given the before taxes prices for labor wt and
capital Rt. They have access to the production function F(kt, nt), which has constant
returns to scale and decreasing marginal productivity of capital and labor. Assume
Fk(O,n) = oo, Fn(k, O) = oo, and Fk(oo, n) < 1/if.
Market equilibrium
Market must clear every period. For the goods market, this means that the resource
constraint must be met every period
ct + gt + kt+ 1 = F(kt, nt).
Factor markets clear when factor prices equal the marginal productivity of each
factor: wt = Fn(kt,nt) and R, = Fk(kt, nt).
1.2.2 Allocations Attainable under Commitment
Consider the commitment economy in which the government makes all its decisions for
the future at the beginning of time. Households make their decisions after observing
the policy plan decided by the government.
Let 7r = (0,o, , ... ) denote the sequence of government policies 7rt = (tk, in,
Tt, qt, ge), let x = (x0 , x1 , ...) denote the sequence of allocations xt = (ct, nt, kt+1 , bt+),
and let p = (po,Pl, ...) denote the sequence of market clearing prices Pt = (Rt, wt).
An allocation x is attainable under commitment if there are policies 7r and prices
p such that (i) households maximize utility subject to their budget constraints and
no Ponzi condition, (ii) the government meets its budget constraint with Tt _> 0 and,
(iii) factor prices equal marginal productivity of factors and the resource constraint
is met.
Following the approach developed by Lucas and Stokey (1983), we can plug the
first order condition for the households' problem into the households' budget con-
straint and obtain the economy's implementability condition. Lemma 1 shows that
an allocation is attainable under equilibrium if and only if it meets the implementabil-
ity condition and the resource constraint, as well as a transversality condition. Lemma
1 is proven in the appendix.
Lemma 1 An allocation x is attainable under commitment if and only if it meets the
following conditions for t > 0
m(ct ,nt) + Oat+1 > at
ct + gt + kt+l = F(kt, nt)
lim /3ta t+ l = 0
t0-+oo
given ko and ao = uc(co, no) [Fk(ko, no)(1 - rk)ko + bo], with m(ct, nt) and at given by
m(ct, nt) - uc(ct, nt)ct+ Un(ct, nt)nt
at uc(ct, nt) c (c t- n t- 1)kt + bt] for t > 0.
I 3uc(ct, nt)
Using a change of variables, we have replaced the level of government bonds for
the value of consumer assets at. This will allow us to write the problem recursively
using as state variables the level of capital and the value of consumer assets. This
approach builds on Werning (2003), who rewrites the problem in Aiyagari, Marcet,
Sargent and Seppala (2002) using the value of debt and the state of an exogenous
Markov process as state variables.
The capital and labor income taxes associated with a given allocation x are de-
termined by
k = 1-1 uc(ct,nt)
t+ 3Fk(kt+l , nt+ ) uc(ct+l, nt+ 1)
S1 Un(ct, nt)r: = 1+.
Fn (kt, nt) uc(ct, nt)
We can guarantee that the transversality condition lim /3tat+i = 0 is met by
constraining a to always be below the natural debt limit -(kt) which is the maximum
debt level that can be repaid by the government
cc
(k) =- max ~ 3-8tm(c,, n,) st c, + k,+l < F(k,, n,).
cnk S=t
From now on the implementability condition and the resource constraint will be
used as necessary and sufficient conditions for an allocation to be attainable under
commitment with the underlying condition that at must remain below this upper
bound.
This characterization of allocations attainable under commitment will be useful
to determine the optimal policies with or without commitment since in both cases the
resulting allocations will have to be chosen by households who anticipate a given set
of policies, which means that their outcomes must be attainable under commitment.
1.2.3 Optimal Taxes with Commitment
This section derives the optimal policy plan when the government can choose the
policies for all future periods at time zero. It introduces a recursive formulation
of the problem (that will also be used for the no commitment case) to derive the
benchmark Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result of zero capital taxes in the long
run.
The Ramsey problem chooses among all the allocations attainable under com-
mitment, the one that maximizes the welfare of the representative consumer. The
outcome of a Ramsey equilibrium is a sequence x that maximizes the present value
of utility E-o 0 Ot[u(ct, n) + v(gt)] subject to x being attainable under commitment
and given an initial stock of capital k0 > 0 and an initial promise for the value of
consumer assets ao < -(ko). This formulation assumes that the initial planner has
committed to a given ao. If instead we wanted to assume that the government had
an initial outstanding debt of b0 we would have to add the following restriction for
the initial period ao = uc(co, n o) [Fk(ko, no)(1 - rok)ko + b0]. Given this, we can write
the Ramsey problem using the following sequence formulation
00
V(ko, ao) -- max 3tP[u(ct,nt) + v(gt)]
c,n,g,k,a t-O
subject to m(c±, nt) + 6at+1 > at
ct + gt + kt+1 = F(kt, nt).
Using a and k as state variables this problem can be written recursively in the
following way
V(k,a) = max [u(c,n) + v(g) + OV(k',a')]
c,n,g,k,a
subject to m(c, n) + Pa' > a
c + g + k' < F(k, n).
If m(c, n) is concave, then the constraint set is convex, which means that the
value function V(k, a) will be concave, and the first order conditions are necessary
and sufficient for optimality. If this condition is not met, first order conditions are
still necessary for an optimum, but no longer sufficient, since it is also necessary to
verify that the second order conditions are met to make sure we are at a maximum.
Using it as the multiplier on the implementability condition and p as the multiplier
on the resource constraint, we can write the Lagrangean for this problem in the
following way
L = u(c, n) + v(g) + /V(k', a') + t[m(c, n) + Pa' - a] - p[c + g + k' - F(k, n)].
Combining the first order conditions for k' and a' with the envelope conditions for
k and a, we get the following equations
Vk(k,a) = /Fk(k,n)Vk(k',a')
Va(k' , a') = Va (k,a).
A steady state for the Ramsey economy has constant c, n, g, k and a as well
as constant multipliers 1 and p. From the optimality condition for k, it is clear
that in steady state #Fk = 1. Plugging into the expression for capital taxes, it is
straightforward to see that capital taxes must be zero in steady state
Sk 1 uc =0.kulu
23Fk U/
23
Labor taxes, on the other hand, will remain positive in steady state
1 un4-" = 1 + •- -•t Fn Urc
This is the well known Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) result that capital income
taxes converge to zero in the long run.
1.3 Sustainable Equilibria without Commitment
This section introduces lack of commitment by modelling the taxation problem as a
game where the government and the agents in the economy make sequential decisions
every period. The equilibrium concept is defined and a simple characterization of
equilibrium outcomes is formalized based on a maximum threat point of reversion to
the worst equilibrium, in the spirit of Abreu (1988).
1.3.1 Game Setup
This section introduces a game where the lack of commitment is modelled explicitly
and the value of default that sustains the initial plan is determined endogenously.
Since households and firms behave competitively, whereas the government behaves
strategically, I will use the notion of sustainable equilibria introduced by Chari and
Kehoe (1990), where all strategies are conditional on the past history of the govern-
ment's actions.
Chari and Kehoe (1993a and 1993b) model debt default in a setup without capi-
tal. Both papers allow the government to default on its bonds. In Chari and Kehoe
(1993a) it is assumed that households can always commit to repay their debt. Con-
versely, in Chari and Kehoe (1993b) it is assumed that households cannot commit
to their debt, which means that debt repayment cannot be enforced at all, leading
to no loans being made to households in equilibrium. By introducing an endogenous
punishment for default, we now make the households' default decision non trivial
since they will only default if they expect not to get punished harshly enough.
Assume that the government cannot commit to future taxes and transfers. Fur-
thermore, both households and the government can default on their bonds. The
government can punish consumers who defaulted. Namely, each period the govern-
ment chooses Pt > 0, which is the utility loss that consumers who defaulted in the
previous period experience. Let dt be an indicator function for whether the govern-
ment defaults and dt be the percentage of consumers who defaulted in period t.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the gov-
ernment decides by how much to punish consumers who defaulted in the previous
period, whether to default on its bonds, and which taxes and transfers to set for the
current period. Note that the government does not need to know which households
defaulted; it is sufficient that the government knows the percentage of households
who defaulted. Since each household has mass zero, the action of a finite number of
households does not affect the percentage of households defaulting, which means that
they are still non strategic. To put the punishment into practice the government will
then rely on an outside independent institution (maybe courts) which will be able to
punish each defaulting household.
After the government has made its choices, allocations and prices are jointly de-
termined by the households' and the firms' maximization problems at market clearing
prices.
1.3.2 Strategies
The government's actions in period t now include the punishment and decision to
default, so that the expanded vector of government's actions is now It = (tk Tt, T qtt,
gt, d9 , Pt).
Each period, every household chooses how much to consume, work and invest in
capital and bonds. It also decides whether to default on its debt. Let d"' be an indi-
cator function for whether household i chooses to default in period t. The vector of
individual decisions in each period is Xt = (c , nr, kt+, b+ , dr). The vector of aggre-
gate choices that results from the households decisions is Xt = (ct, nt, kt+ 1, bt+ 1, dy),
where the aggregate value of each aggregate variable is the integral over all the house-
holds in the economy of the individual variables. In equilibrium, since all households
are identical and follow pure strategies, the aggregate action will be the same as each
individual action.
The price vector is Pt = (Re, wt) as before.
Let ht be the history of government decisions until time t so that ht = (i0, ..., 1t).
Following Chari and Kehoe (1990), all the strategies in the game will be contingent
only on this history, since households are infinitesimal and have no power to influence
Xt, which means that they will not behave strategically. Thus, knowing the house-
holds' strategies and government's actions until time t is enough to characterize all
the history until then.
The strategy for the government is given by a. The strategy for each period t
is a mapping from the history ht- 1 into the government's decision space I-t, so that
UIt = uat(ht-1). When choosing a given strategy, the government anticipates that
histories will evolve according to ht = (ht_ 1, ot(ht-1)). Let at denote the sequence of
government strategies from time t onwards.
The strategy for a representative household is given by f. The strategy for each
period t is a mapping from the history ht into the households' decision space Xt, so
that Xt = X2 = ft(ht). Let ft denote the sequence of household strategies from time
t onwards.
Firms and markets jointly work as a third player that has strategy 0 mapping the
history ht into the vector of factor prices Pt, so that pt = 4(ht). Let ft denote the
sequence of household strategies from time t onwards.
In the next section we will specify how each player chooses its strategy in a sus-
tainable equilibrium.
1.3.3 Sustainable Equilibria
At time t, the government and households choose an action for time t and a contingent
plan for the future. This is equivalent to choosing an action for today while anticipat-
ing future behavior since both the government and households have time consistent
preferences, which means that the plan they choose today will be optimal tomorrow.
The problem solved by the government and households at time t is described below.
For every history ht-1, given allocation rule f and pricing rule ¢, the government
chooses at to maximize the present value of utility
00Z -t[u(c,(h.), n,(h,)) + v(g,(h,-1)) - dt(h,-1)P,(h,-1)]
s=t
subject to
g(h- 1) + T8(h~_1) = w8 (h8 )r•(h_1 )n,(h.) + R,(h,)rk(h-l)k,(hll) +
qt(h,-l)bs+1(h,) - bs(h._1)(1 - d (h,))(1 - dt(h_-1))
T>(h_ 1) > 0
and realizing that future histories are induced by at according to h, = (h,_ 1, a,(h,-_1)).
For every history ht, given policy rule a (and the histories it induces) and pricing
rule 4, each household chooses ft to maximize the present value of utility
0O
s=tp'~ [u(c' (h,), n} (h,)) - df(h,-1)P,(h, -1)]
subject to
c(hs) = w,(h,)(1 - 7T,(h_-1))n'(h8 ) + T,(h_-1) +
bz(h-1)(1 - dt(h,))(1 - dfs(hS- 1)) - q,(hS-1)bS+1(hs) +
Rs(hs)(1 - 7,k(he-1))k,(h._l) - k'+l(hs).
Market clearing and firm optimality require that for every history ht firm demand
must equal household supply for every production factor, which happens when factor
prices equal their marginal productivity, so that qt(ht) is given by
wt(ht) = Fn(kt(ht-), nt(ht))
Rt(ht) = Fk(k (ht-1), nt(ht))
A sustainable equilibrium is a triplet (u, f, 0) that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) given f and q, the continuation of contingent policy plan a solves the government's
problem for every history ht-1; (ii) given a and 4, the continuation of contingent
allocation rule f solves the households' problem for every history ht; (iii) given f and
0, the continuation of the contingent pricing rule q is such that factor prices equal
marginal productivity for every history ht.
1.3.4 Worst Sustainable Equilibrium
Let V(a, f, ¢) denote the present value of utility that results from a sustainable equi-
librium (a, f, ¢). Then the worst sustainable equilibrium is the sustainable equilib-
rium that leads to the lowest value V(a, f, ¢). It will be useful to find the worst
sustainable equilibrium to then define which equilibria can be sustained without ex-
ante commitment, since the worst sustainable equilibrium is the worst punishment
that can be credibly inflicted on a government that deviates from a predefined plan.
Lemma 2 The value of the worst sustainable equilibrium only depends on the current
capital level: V(uw, fw, Ow) = Vw(k).
A proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix. The idea is that the value
of a worst equilibrium can only depend on the current payoff relevant variables. Fur-
thermore, since the government can eliminate debt by defaulting, no additional pun-
ishment can be given to it, which means that the value of the worst sustainable
equilibrium will not depend on the level of debt.
For our model the worst sustainable equilibrium is an equilibrium where all agents
default on their debt and the government always expropriates capital.
The default equilibrium is a triplet (ad, fd, 0d) where agents have the following
strategies:
(i) The government always defaults on bt, never punishes consumers, always taxes
capital at confiscatory rates, and sets qt = 0. Transfers and labor taxes implement
the solution to the following problem
max [u(ct, nt) + v(gt)]
Ctnt,gt
subject to m(ct, nt) > 0
ct + gt = F(kt, nt).
(ii) Households default if bt < 0, never invest in capital, and never lend or borrow
from the government. Labor and consumption solve the following problem
max u(ct, nrt)
Ct,nt
subject to ct = Tt + wt(1 - rtn)nt.
(iii) Factor prices equal marginal productivity of factors.
Lemma 3 The default equilibrium is the worst sustainable equilibrium:
V(aw, fw, q5) = Vw (k) = Vd(k).
The worst sustainable equilibrium punishes the government by giving households
beliefs about the government's future behavior that lead to low future value. However,
these beliefs have to be correct, so the government has to be given incentives to keep
the plan. Phelan and Stachetti show that in general the government's incentive
constraint will be binding, which means the continuation value of a worst sustainable
equilibrium will not be a worst sustainable equilibrium. However, since we allow the
government to make lump sum transfers to the households, even when the government
gives households extremely pessimistic beliefs that capital will be fully expropriated
in the following period, the government's incentive constraint will not bind since it
is always willing to tax capital at maximal rates and then redistribute back to the
households.
Since households always expect the government to fully expropriate capital, they
will never invest even though capital is very productive. Furthermore, if any house-
hold actually invests, it will be in the government's best interest to expropriate it
since capital is sunk ex-post. Thus, this lack of commitment will lead to an ex-
tremely inefficient investment decision. Since both households and the government
are best responding to each other's strategy, the default equilibrium is sustainable.
The appendix proves that the default equilibrium is the worst sustainable equilibrium.
Since the best the government can do when households are playing a default
equilibrium is to maximize its per period utility, the flow utility reached in a period
when the initial stock of capital is k is given by
Ud(k) = max [u(c, n) + v(g)] st m(c, n) > 0, c + g = F(k, n)
c,n,g
and the net present value of a default equilibrium is
Vd(k) = Ud(k)+ • ud(0),1-0
which only depends on the initial level of k.
1.3.5 Characterization of Sustainable Outcomes
In the spirit of Abreu's optimal punishments, we will use reversion to the worst sus-
tainable equilibrium as the maximum threat point that allows us to sustain equilibria.
Thus, for an equilibrium to be sustainable, it must yield higher utility than the worst
sustainable equilibrium in all future dates. We are using the terminology of Abreu
(1988), who defines optimal punishments when firms deviate in a cartel. Here, there
is not any kind of collusion per se, but we still need to enforce cooperation since
the government's ex-ante and ex-post incentives are not aligned. Thus, the worst
punishment is not inflicted by other firms, but rather by changing the consumer's
expectations, which leads to a different equilibrium that is worse for everyone.
The next lemma characterizes the entire set of sustainable equilibrium outcomes,
which are the allocations that are induced by a particular sustainable equilibrium.
Lemma 4 An allocation x is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium if and only if:
(i) x is attainable under commitment.
(ii) The continuation value of x is always better than the worst sustainable equi-
librium 00
E #'-'[u (c, nt) + v(gt)] _ Vd(ki).
t=i
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix. The idea is that for
an allocation to be the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium, it is necessary that
households and firms are optimizing given the government's strategy, which means
that the resulting allocation must be attainable under commitment. Government
optimality requires that it is never in the government's best interest to deviate. Since
the worst punishment after a deviation is Vd(k), this gives us a lower bound on the
utility that can be reached in a sustainable equilibrium at any point in time.
1.4 Best Sustainable Equilibrium
Now that the set of sustainable equilibria has been characterized, we turn to finding
among these, the one that maximizes the initial welfare for the society for given initial
conditions for k0 and ao. As before, assuming commitment to a given ao in the initial
period is a a simplifying assumption that can be relaxed. Assume that a0 is within
the necessary bounds for an equilibrium to exist.
1.4.1 Sequence Approach
The outcome of the best sustainable equilibrium solves
00
V(ko, ao) = max t [u(ct, nt) + v(gt)]
c,n,g,k,a t•
t=o
subject to m(ct, nt) + Pat+, > at
c + gt + kt+l ~= F(kt, nt)
E O-'[u(ct, nt) + v(gt)] >_ Vd(k,).
t=i
This follows directly from lemma 4. Since the three restrictions are necessary and
sufficient for a sustainable equilibrium, then the allocation that maximizes welfare
subject to them must be the outcome of the best sustainable equilibrium.
This formulation is equivalent to the Ramsey problem under commitment, with
an additional incentive compatibility condition that ensures that, at each point in
time, the government never wants to deviate from the predefined plan.
Notice that one of our restrictions now has an endogenous function Vd(ki), which
is concave. Given this, the constraint set may not be convex, even if we assumed that
m(ct, nt) is concave. Thus, we cannot guarantee that V(k, a) is a concave function. In
the analysis that follows we proceed as if V(k, a) were concave. The appendix shows
that the same results follow through even if that is not the case.
Let xfb(ko) - argmax -7o t [u(ct,nt) + v(gt)] st ct + gt + kt+1 = F(kt, nt) be
the first best allocation when the economy has initial capital k0 .
Then the implementability constraint will not be binding for ao < a(ko), which is
defined by a(ko) E0 0 0/3tm(ctb(ko), ntb(ko))-
Notice that V fb(k) =- V(k, a(k)) > Vd(k), which means that if the implementabil-
ity condition is not binding, then the incentive compatibility condition will not bind
either. The reason for this is straightforward: if the government does not have to
use distortionary taxation to finance its spending, then it has no incentive to deviate
from the optimal plan.
Since the implementability condition is not binding for a0 < a(k0), then having
lower a0 does not bring any additional benefit to the economy, which means that
Va(k, a) = 0 for a < a(k). On the other hand, if a > a(k), then starting off with a
lower ao relaxes the implementability condition, which implies that Va(k, a) < 0 for
a > a(k).
1.4.2 Recursive Approach
The program to find the best sustainable equilibrium can also be written recursively
as stated below. The appendix shows that the two formulations are equivalent, and
from now on the recursive approach will be used.
V(k, a) = max [u(c, n) + v(g) + 3V(k', a')]
c,n,g,k,a
subject to m(c, n) + Pa' > a
c + g + k' = F(k, n)
V(k',a') > Vd(k').
The Lagrangean for this problem is
L = u(c, n) + v(g) + /V(k', a') + p[m(c, n) + 3a' - a]
-p[c + g + k' - F(k, n)] + y3[V(k', a') - Vd(k')].
Combining the first order conditions for ki and al with the envelope conditions
for k and a, we get the following equations
Vk(k',a/ = Vk(k, a) + y[Vkd(k') - Vk(k', a')]VFk(k, n)
Va(k', a')(1 + y) = Va(k, a).
The optimality condition for k shows how the lack of commitment can distort the
choice of capital in the short run. If commitment binds ('y > 0) and the value of
default reacts more to changes in capital than the value of the optimal sustainable
plan, then capital will be distorted downward, since this will help loosen the incentive
compatibility constraint. If conversely, the value of the optimal sustainable plan varies
more with capital, than capital will be distorted upward. Thus, if higher capital
makes commitment less binding, it will be optimal to subsidize capital. This result
is reminiscent of the findings of Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), who show that it
could be optimal to either tax or subsidize capital. However, here this will only be
true in the short run, since in the long run the economy will converge to a steady
state where commitment does not bind.
The optimality condition for a says that it is optimal for the value of government
assets to decrease over time as long as commitment is binding, which leads to an
increase of government assets over time. The reason for this is that when the gov-
ernment accumulates assets, it gets a direct benefit of higher utility tomorrow, as
well as an additional benefit from loosening the incentive compatibility condition in
the future. Thus, to some extent, government assets work as a commitment mecha-
nism that reduces the incentive to default by increasing the welfare of the equilibrium
strategy.
The next section describes the long run properties of the economy without com-
mitment.
1.4.3 Steady State
In this section we derive the paper's main result that capital taxes must converge
to zero in the long run. We start by showing that any steady state must have zero
capital taxes and then show that the economy will indeed converge to a steady state.
Proposition 1 (Zero capital taxes in steady state) In steady state, the best
sustainable equilibrium has zero capital taxes.
Proof. Assume the economy is in a steady state with constant c, n, g, k, and a.
The first order conditions for c and n (uc + pmc = p and un + 1Amn = -p/F,) imply
that p and y must also be constant. We can now prove by contradiction that capital
taxes cannot be different from zero in the long run.
If capital taxes are not zero, then /Fk(k, n) = 1. From the optimality condition
for k derived above, this implies that y > 0 (recall that 7 > 0 since it is the multiplier
on an inequality constraint). We can see in the optimality condition for a that when
-y > 0, it must be true that Va(k, a) = 0 is equal to zero in steady state. But then
it must be true that a < a(k) and V(a, k) = Vfb(k) > Vd(k), which means that the
incentive compatibility condition cannot be binding and we must have 7 = 0, which
means we have reached a contradiction and capital taxes cannot be different from
zero in steady state. m
Proposition 2 (Positive labor taxes in steady state) In steady state, the best
sustainable equilibrium has positive labor taxes as long as ao > a(ko).
Proof. Let -(k) be the highest value of a such that the incentive compatibility
condition is met, which is defined by V(-(k), k) = Vd(k). Since Vfb(k) -= V(a(k), k)
and Vfb(k) > Vd(k), it must be the case that the following inequality holds
Vfb(k) = V(a(k), k) > V(-(k), k) = Vd(k).
Since V•/ = 0 for a < a(k) and Va < 0 for a > a(k), this implies that i(k) > a(k),
which means that the incentive compatibility condition stops binding before natural
asset limit is achieved.
In steady state, the incentive compatibility condition is either exactly met, or it is
slack. If the incentive compatibility is exactly met, then a = d(k) > a(k), which means
that p > 0 since a(k) is the highest value of a for which the implementability condition
does not bind. If incentive compatibility is slack, then given that a' = (1 + y)p, it
must be the case that p is constant since the last time the incentive compatibility
condition binded (or since the initial period, if it never binded), where it was strictly
positive by the argument above. *
Proposition 3 (Convergence to steady state) The best sustainable equilibrium
converges to a steady state.
Proof. The first order conditions describe the unique path for the economy for
given initial conditions.
If 7 converges to zero, then the long run dynamics of capital and a are like those
of an economy without commitment, which are governed by
Vk I k (k a))Vk( ',a') = Vk( a)
O Fk (k, n)
Va(k', a') = Va(k, a).
This means that capital will increase as long as it is below its steady state level
(3Fk > 1) and increase when it is above the steady state level (3Fk < 1), so that it
converges to its steady state.
If -y does not converge to zero, then Va(k, a) must converge to zero since 7- is weakly
positive and Va(k', a')(1 + -7) = Va (k, a). But we have just seen that when Va (k, a) is
close to zero, the implementability condition cannot be binding, which means that -y
must converge to zero. m
As long as commitment is binding, increasing government savings not only in-
creases tomorrow's continuation value, but also loosens the incentive compatibility
constraint. Thus, the government will keep saving until it has achieved enough as-
sets for the incentive compatibility to stop binding. This will happen before the
government reaches its asset limit, since V(a(k), k) > Vd(k).
We have seen so far that without commitment the economy will still converge
to a steady state where commitment does not bind. Next we explore the long run
implications that the lack of commitment may have.
With commitment, a steady state had to meet the following conditions
un + Pmn = -pFn uc + pmc = p
c+ g + k = F(k,n) v 9 = p
pTi[m(c, n) - a(1 - ,3)] = 0 /3Fk = 1.
Without commitment, any steady state commitment still has to meet the previous
conditions, but it also has to meet the incentive compatibility condition
1
V(k, a) = [u(c, n) + v(g)] > Vd(k).
1-/3
Thus, all steady states without commitment are also steady states under com-
mitment. However, the converse need not be true. In particular, steady states with
a very indebted government (which translates into a high level of a) need to use
more distortionary taxation, which reduces the present value of utility, so that the
incentive compatibility condition may not hold. As one would expect, more indebted
governments have a higher incentive to default. Conversely, steady states where the
government has a substantial amount of assets do not need to use much distortionary
taxation, which reduces the incentive to default and expropriate capital.
1.5 Numerical Simulations
To illustrate the results of the model, consider an economy with preferences given by
u(c, n) + v(g) = ln(c) - ni+o/(1 + 9) + ln(g)
and production function
F(k, n) = Aki -nla + Bn + Ck,
where the specific parameters are 0 = 1, /3 = 0.4, A = 2, B = 0.5, C = 0.5, and
a = 0.5.
We will start by looking at the short run dynamics of this economy for given initial
conditions, in order to see how the lack of commitment changes the path towards the
steady state and what welfare costs it entails.
Next, we turn too see how commitment changes the feasible steady states of this
economy, in order to infer what the long run implications of lack of commitment are.
1.5.1 Short Run Dynamics
The recursive problem can be written as
V(k,a)
subject to
= max {U(k,a,k'a') + OV(k', a')}
V(k', a') > Vd(k ' )
where U(k, a, k'a') is given by
U(k, a, k'a') = max[u(c, n) + v(g)]
cng
subject to m(c, n) + Oa' > a
c + g + k' = F(k, n).
The first step of the simulation is to construct U(k, a, k'a'). For computational
convenience, it is useful to stack the state variables for each period into one single
dimension. If we exclude initial conditions where the implementability condition is
not binding, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the implementability con-
dition holds with equality. Given this and the previous assumptions for the functional
form, we can write the implementability condition as 1-n 1+ + Oa' > a, which means
we can solve for n(k, a, k'a'), which is a matrix that gives us the optimal choice of
n for a given state today on one axis and a given state tomorrow on the other axis.
Given the functional form for utility it is optimal to have g = c. Thus, we can use
the resource constraint to find g(k, a, k'a') and c(k, a, k'a'). Finally, we can use these
matrices to compute U(k, a, k'a') = u[c(k, a, k'a'), n(k, a, k'a')] + v[g(k, a, k'a')].
Given this, we can make an initial guess for V(k, a) and iterate on it until we find
a fixed point. For the case where there is no commitment, this iteration includes a
large punishment when the incentive compatibility constraint is violates. This ensures
that for the chosen solution the constraint is always met.
Figure 1-1 shows the optimal path for an economy with initial capital stock ko =
0.1 and an initial promise for the value of consumer assets a0 = 1.3. Dashed lines
represent the economy with commitment, whereas the solid lines represent the no-
commitment economy.
For the parameter values we have assumed, capital is being subsidized when the
incentive compatibility is binding. This reflects the fact that the value of the best
equilibrium is more sensitive to changes in the level of capital than the worst equilib-
rium. Thus, increasing capital relaxes the incentive compatibility condition.
In the economy without commitment, the value of a also decreases in initial periods
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Figure 1-1: Transition Dynamics with and without Commitment
(which is
taxes are
equivalent to reducing the government's debt) so that, in the future, labor
lower and labor and capital levels are higher without commitment.
As a consequence, capital levels are higher in the economy without commitment
both in the short run (due to the capital subsidy) and in the long run (due to lower
labor taxes).
The initial value of welfare in the economy with commitment is -5.57, whereas, for
the economy without commitment, initial welfare is -5.82. This difference represents
the cost of lack of commitment.
In the long run, however, the welfare in the economy without commitment (-3.41)
is higher than in the economy with commitment (-4.08), since the economy without
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commitment reduced its debt in the initial periods, which means that it does not have
to do as much distortionary taxation in steady state. Thus, while there is a short run
cost to commitment, in the long run, an economy whose government cannot commit
ex-ante may actually have higher welfare.
1.5.2 Long Run Implications
In the long run, commitment will not be binding even if the government cannot
commit to policies ex ante. Section 4.3 shows that steady states without commitment
are also steady states in the economy with commitment, albeit with different initial
conditions. However, the converse need not be true since, without commitment,
we cannot sustain steady state equilibria of the economy with commitment where
the incentive compatibility condition is not met. Thus, introducing the inability of
governments to commit can help us predict what kinds of equilibria we might expect
to find.
Figure 1-2 plots the set of steady state equilibria under commitment, indexed by
the steady state level of capital. Notice that steady states with higher capital also have
lower a, which means that the government is less indebted. Thus, V(k, a) increases
with capital not only because capital is increasing but also because a is decreasing.
Labor and consumption are increasing with capital, exactly because steady states
with higher capital have lower labor taxes.
To find which steady states are still feasible when the government cannot commit
to future policies, the top panels plot the value of default associated with the capital
level that is chosen in each of the equilibria. The left panel shows the value of default
in our baseline model, whereas the right panel plots the value of default when the
depreciated capital cannot be reconverted into consumption goods. As would be
expected, in the economy with irreversible capital, the value of default is higher, but
the qualitative results do not change1 . Without commitment, steady states must meet
1If capital depreciates at rate 6 and the non-depreciated capital is irreversible then capital income
taxes still converge to zero in the long run in the best sustainable equilibrium. The more substantial
difference is that default is now more attractive, since in the default equilibrium the level capital
remains positive and only decreases as it depreciates, which does not allow such as stark punishment
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Figure 1-2: Steady States achievable with and without Commitment
the incentive compatibility constraint V(k, a) > Vd(k), which means that only steady
states with a high enough level of capital are sustainable. In general, steady states
where the government is very indebted will not be feasible without commitment. In
particular, when governments approach their natural debt limit and need to tax labor
income at very distortionary levels, it becomes more likely that they will default on
their past promises.
as before. Let the value of a default equilibrium in this case be given by VD(k).
The outcome of the best sustainable equilibrium solves
V(k, a) = max (u(c, n) + v(g) + 3V(k', a')]
c,n,g,k,a
subject to m(c, n) + /a' > a
c + g + k'= F(k,n) + (1 -6 )k
kt+l _> (1 - 5)kt
V(k', a') > VD(k ')
Since VD (k) is still lower than Vfb(k) capital taxes are still zero in the long run.
The value for depreciation is J = 1 - C, so that the steady state equilibria with commitment
remain unchanged with or without irreversibility of capital.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
If the government is allowed to accumulate assets, then, even if it cannot commit to
a stream of future taxes, in the long run capital taxes will converge to zero. The
previous literature on taxation without commitment had found that this was not the
case when the government was forced to keep budget balance in every period. The
reason for this disparity is that, in the absence of commitment, government assets
can work as a commitment device to discipline government behavior that was not
available under budget balance.
Thus, in the short run, economies without commitment will tend to accumulate
more assets. Furthermore, while commitment binds, capital may either be taxed or
subsidized, depending on whether increasing capital loosens or tightens the govern-
ment's incentive constraint.
In the long run, economies without commitment will tend to have a higher asset
level, which leads to higher capital levels since an economy with a richer government
will have lower labor taxes. This in turn increases labor, leading to higher productivity
of capital.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
00
Ro(1 - 7ok)ko + bo <_ (ce - we(1- T:)nt- Ts) qo
t=O
+lirm (kt+1 + bt+).11 q,]
t-0-0o I qt 0
Since the marginal utility of consumption is always positive, it will always be
optimal for households to meet their budget constraint with equality and to choose
the long run values of k an b such that the last term in the budget constraint is not
positive, which would make it more binding.
Together with the no Ponzi condition and the non negativity constraint on capital,
this implies that the following transversality condition must be met
liv m (tt+ + bl+,) ol q. =0.
t--*oo qt
Households thus solve the following problem
max
c,n,b,k
subject to
00
1:Ot(ct, nt)
t=O
ct - wO(1 - 7-)nt - Tt + kt+l + qbt+l = RP(1- rtk)kt + bt
lim [(T + b+l) I qs, =0
cnt,- Ž, give a• dbo.
ct , nt , kt+1 > 0, given ko and bo.
Since we are maximizing a concave function on a convex set, the following first
order conditions, together with the government's budget constraint and the transver-
sality condition, are necessary and sufficient for household optimality
u(ct,nt) + wt(1 - rtn)uc(ct,nt) = 0
kt+ [uc(ct, nt) - fRP+l(1 - rtk+1 )uc(Ct+,nt+)] = 0
qtuc(ct, nt) -/uc(ct+l, nt+) = 0.
Furthermore, the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for firm opti-
mality and market clearing
Wt
cRt + gt + k+
ct + 9t + kt+1
= Fn(k, nt)
= Fk(kt, nt)
= F(k,m t).
Finally, the government has to meet the following constraints
gt + bt + Tt = wt-tnt + 7rtkkt ++ qtbt+l1 and Tt > 0.
Thus an allocation is attainable under commitment if and only if there are prices
and policies such that all the above conditions are met.
We can drop the government's budget constraint since the resource constraint
and the households' budget constraint jointly imply that the government's budget
constraint is always met.
Multiplying the households' budget constraint by uc(ct, nt) and plugging in the
first order condition leads to the following implementability condition
ctuc(ct, nt) + ntu.(ct, nt) + fuc(ct+1, nt+)[ Uc(Ctnt) kt+1 + bt+l]Ouc(ct+l, nt+l)
= uc(ct, nt) [ -1, nt-1)kt + bt] + Ttuc(ct, nt),
uUc(ct, nt)
which can replace the households' budget constraint.
The only conditions that constrain the allocations achievable under commitment
are the implementability condition, the resource constraint, and the transversality
condition. All the remaining conditions can be met by choosing prices and policies.
Furthermore, all the initial conditions can be recovered using this characterization of
the economy. Thus, an allocation is attainable under commitment if and only if it
meets the following conditions
m(ct, nt) + ,3at+l at
ct + gt + kt+l = F(kt, nt)
lim [Btat+x] = 0,
with at - u(ct,nt) uctn) 1kt + bt fort >0 and ao uc (co, no)[Fk(ko,no) (1-
Tok)ko + bo].
The prices and policies that ensure that the remaining conditions are met are the
following
Tt = m(ct, nt) + 3at+1 - at
wt = F.(kt, nt)
= Fk(kt, nt)
rn 1 Un(ct, nt)
-rt = 1 + -
1 uc(ct, nt)
Tt7 = 1-
t+1 1 R- uc(ct+1, nt)
1.7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The value of the worst sustainable equilibrium depends only on the payoff relevant
state variables, which are the current stock of capital and bonds, as well the percentage
of households who defaulted in the previous period.
Suppose that this is not the case and that there are two histories A and B with
the same k, b, and dc, but with VW(A) > Vw(B). Then the value of A could be
decreased if all agents followed the strategies from equilibrium B, which means it
could not have been the worst equilibrium to begin with. Thus, it must be true that
V(ow, f', ,bw) = V"(k,b,dc).
Since Vw(k,b, 0) was the worst sustainable equilibrium when no consumers de-
faulted in the previous period, if dc > 0 and the government decides not to punish
consumers, the welfare cannot be lower than Vw(k, b, 0). This implies the value of
the worst sustainable equilibrium does not depend on whether consumers defaulted
in the previous period.
The value of the worst sustainable equilibrium is also independent of b. Since
Vw(k, 0, d') is the worst equilibrium when the government has no debt, then if the
government defaults on its debt no additional punishment can be given to him, which
means that Vw(k,b, d) Vw(k, O, dc). If b < 0, then Vw(k,b, dc) • Vw(k, 0, dc)
since the politician can achieve Vw(k, 0, dC) by making transfers to consumers and
equilibrium with b < 0 was already the worst possible, which means that no additional
loss of welfare will be possible. Furthermore, it cannot be the case that VW(k, b, de) >
Vw(k, 0, dc) when b > 0 since then there would be a worst equilibrium where all
households default.
Thus, the value of the worst sustainable equilibrium can only depend on the initial
level of capital.
1.7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
In the worst sustainable equilibrium, households' beliefs about the following subgame
are manipulated to yield the worst possible payoffs for the government. As we have
seen, in each period households make their decisions according to
uc (c, n) F, (k, n)(1 - Tn ) + un(c, n) = 0
k' {uc (c, n) - 3u,(c', n')Fk(k', n')(1 - Tk')} = 0
ct + kt+l = R1(1 - Tk)kt + Wt(1 - iTn)nt + Tt
Following Phelan and Stachetti (2001), define z' as the marginal value of capital
for households tomorrow z' - uc(c', n')Fk(k',n')(1 - Tk'). The only way to affect
households actions is by changing this value.
Let us now consider the government's problem when faced with a worst sustainable
equilibrium. Let VW(k) be the expected payoff of the worst sustainable equilibrium
when initial capital is k. Since the worst equilibrium the government can be given
tomorrow is VW(k'), then the following equilibrium is always available, which means
that Vw(k) > V(k, z')
V(k,z') = max {u(c, n) + v(g) + OV (k')}
c,n,g,k'
subject to m(c, n) + k'u(c, n) > 0
c+ g + k' = F(k, n)
k'[u,(c, n) - Oz'] = 0.
Let z' E [z, -] be the values of z that can be sustained tomorrow. Then the worst
sustainable equilibrium must be given by
VW(k) = min V(k, z').
From government's optimality we cannot have VW(k) < min V(k, z').
Suppose VW(k) > minV(k, z'). Then this could not be the worst sustainable
equilibrium since a lower payoff could be reached by giving consumers expectations
z' = arg min V(k, z').
Since V(k, z') is increasing in z', it achieves its minima at the lower bound z =
0. This means that consumers will expect capital to be taxed at confiscatory rates
tomorrow, which implies that there will be no investment in capital. Furthermore, it
will always be incentive compatible for the government to expropriate capital. Thus,
the default equilibrium is the worst sustainable equilibrium.
1.7.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that the allocation x is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium (a, f, 0).
Consumer optimality requires that x maximizes the households utility at time zero
given the policies and prices along the equilibrium path. Government optimality
implies that the government must satisfy its budget constraints from time zero on.
Furthermore, in a sustainable equilibrium factor prices must equal marginal produc-
tivity of factors and the resource constraint must hold along the equilibrium path.
Thus, the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium x must be attainable under commit-
ment, which means that condition (i) must hold. At any time t, after history ht- 1,
if the government deviates from the equilibrium path, it will get a payoff higher or
equal to Vd(kt). Government optimality requires that not deviating must yield a
higher payoff than deviating, which means that the present value of future profits
must be at least as high as Vd(kt), which means that condition (ii) must hold at
every time t. Thus, if an allocation x is the outcome of a sustainable equilibrium
(a, f, 4) it must meet conditions (i) and (ii).
Suppose now that an allocation x meets conditions (i) and (ii). Let ir and ¢ be
the policies and prices that implement this allocation under commitment. Consider
the following strategy for households: as long as the government's action is according
to 7r, choose allocation x; if the government deviates, follow the default equilibrium
strategy. Likewise, consider the government's strategy where it acts according to 7r
along the equilibrium path and plays the default strategies off equilibrium. Finally,
consider factor prices that are equal to the marginal productivity of each factor of
production for every possible history ht. We will show that this is a sustainable
equilibrium. First, consider histories where there have been no deviations until time
t. Since x is attainable under equilibrium, and along the equilibrium path households
will expect to face policies 7r and prices q, this means that the continuation of x
must be optimal for consumers. The government, on the other hand, can choose
to deviate, in which case it would get Vd(kt), or it can follow the equilibrium path.
Since condition (ii) ensures that the payoff along the equilibrium path is always
higher than Vd(kt), then it is always incentive compatible for the government not to
deviate. Now, consider histories where there has been a deviation before time t. Our
strategy has specified that in this case both households and the government will play
a default equilibrium, which we have shown to be sustainable. Thus, the specified set
of strategies is a sustainable equilibrium that leads to outcome x.
1.7.5 Equivalence of Sequence and Recursive Approaches
The Lagrangean for the sequence problem to find the best sustainable equilibrium can
be written in the following way, where -t is the multiplier on the implementability
condition, pt is the multiplier on the resource constraint, and t is the multiplier on
incentive compatibility condition
0 u(ct, nt) + - [m(ct, nt) + Oat+, - at]
t=o - [ct + gt + kt+1 - F(kt, nt)]
i=1 t=i
The first order conditions for this problem are
t
uct(1 + + 1itmnct
i=1
t
usn(1 + n) + j2 m,
i=1
Pt+1FI1 - d+IV(kt+I)
PZt+l
APt
= -ptFnt
= At
= Pt
=[t
The first order conditions for the recursive problem in section 1.4.2 are
uc + ymc = P
Un + ,amn = -pFn
V9 = p
Va (a', k')(1 + y) = -
Vk(a', k') = p/ 3 + [Vkd(k') - Vk(a', k')]
and the envelope conditions for a and k are
Va(a, k) = -p
Vk(a, k) = pFk(k, n).
It is easy to see that the equilibrium conditions for the two problems lead to the
same allocations for c, n, k, and a for as long as the multipliers for the constraints
in the recursive formulation p, p, and y have the following relationship with the
multipliers in the sequence approach
1 + EZ TiPtP =
1+Ezi1+7 = e1 + E 7i
Furthermore, the following transversality condition must be met in both formula-
tions
lim /t V(kt, at) = 0.
Since the best sustainable equilibrium converges to a steady state, which has
positive and finite allocations, the transversality condition is met.
1.7.6 Impossibility of non zero Capital Taxes in Steady State
We will now show that any steady state of the best sustainable equilibrium must have
zero capital taxes without imposing concavity of V(kt, at).
The idea is that if commitment were binding in the long run, then the imple-
mentability condition would stop binding, and labor taxes would converge to zero.
But this can not be an optimal steady state, since it is optimal to take a deviation
where labor taxes are increased marginally (with zero first order cost) to increase gov-
ernment assets and make the incentive compatibility constraint less binding (which
has a positive first order effect).
More formally, assume that there is a steady state where capital taxes are different
from zero. Let c" , n s , gss, ass and k' be the allocations in this steady state. In order
to meet first order conditions, these steady states must also have constant multipliers
pS, ps', 7s. In steady state, the optimality condition for capital becomes
p"Fk(k8 , n 8 ) = p/3 + [Vd(k" ) - p"Fk(k", n").
Given this we can only have capital taxes different from one and pFk(k", n") 7 1
if 7"• > 0.
The optimality condition for a implies that
P/ 88(1+ 788) = /1L88.
Thus, when 7" > 0 we must have I18 = 0.
But then the first order conditions for consumption, labor and public spending
take the following form
uc(c88, n88) = p8
un(c"8, n" )  = -pssfn(k"s, n a)
v'(g "a) = pa.
Furthermore, it must be true that
V(k", a8 ) = Vd(k -8) < V(k 8 , a(k 8 )) = Vfb(k8").
Now let us consider a departure from this steady state that will lead to higher
welfare than our original candidate for a steady state, thus implying that it could
not be an optimal solution to begin with. The departure is as follows. In an initial
period (let us call it period 0), starting from our initial steady state, we will choose
a, = a" - Aa instead of as8 and ki = k8s . The new levels of consumption, labor and
public spending are the solution to the following problem
[co, no,go] = argmax [u(c, n) + v(g)]
c,n,g
subject to w(c, n) + #(a" - Aa) > a8"
c + g + k"8 = F(k , n).
First, let us check that this deviation is feasible. Clearly the implementability
condition and the resource constraint must be met, by construction of the previous
problem. The government's incentive compatibility condition now becomes
V(k 8 , a s - Aa) > Vd(k").
Since V(k, a) cannot be increasing in a this condition must be met since V(k88 , a88 )
Vd(k") in the original steady state.
Now we will show that taking this deviation has a zero cost up to a first order
approximation. The new flow utility in period zero is given by
W(Aak", a") = max [u(c, n) + v(g)]
c,n,g
subject to w(c, n) + ,3(a" - Aa) > a"
c + g + k" = F(k" , n).
We can write a first order Taylor approximation of this expression in the following
way
W(Aa) = W(O) + AaW'(0).
Given that the implementability is not binding when Aa = 0, then W(Aa) =
W(0), which means that the cost of this deviation is zero to a first order approxima-
tion.
Let us now see if there is any benefit to it. The deviation proceeds as follows.
From period 1 to period T - 1 (which will be defined shortly), the chosen allocations
will be
ct = c" , n t = n 88, gt = g8 kt = k" f or t = 1,..., T - 1
at = a" - /l-tAa for t = 1,...,T.
Let us start by checking that the new plan is feasible from periods 1 to T. First, the
resource constraint must be met since the allocations in this constraint are the same
as in the initial steady state. The incentive compatibility must also hold since V(k, a)
cannot be increasing in a. Finally, the implementability condition will be met since
w(c"', n" ) _ a"(1 - p), which implies that w(c, n) + f(a s - f- t Aa) > a" - fl-Aa.
Let T be defined by the following condition
1
This means that in period T we will reach at = a(k"s) and will be able to increase
V(k"8 , a(k-8)) > V(k 8 , a, ") by switching to the non constrained solution. Further-
more, this will lead to a first order positive welfare increase in the initial period
B(Aa) = '3T[V(kss, a(k"8)) - V(ks, a88)] = V(kas' a(ks))- (k' Aa.
ass - a(ka)
Thus, the net benefit of our deviation is strictly positive for a small enough change
in a, which means that the initial candidate for a steady state was not optimal.

Chapter 2
Education and Optimal Taxation
The optimal income taxation problem studied by Mirrlees takes individual ability as
given. However, ability is to a large extent determined by the amount of education
acquired by workers, which is potentially influenced by income taxes. Thus, the
optimal income tax schedule should take this effect into consideration. This chapter
models the optimal taxation problem when education is endogenous and observable.
In this context, it is optimal to subsidize education in order to offset the distortion
caused by the income tax. If the cost of education is purely monetary, the education
subsidy exactly offsets the income tax, so that the choice of education is not distorted
by income taxes. On the other hand, if the cost of education is an opportunity cost
of time, then the subsidy on education only partially offsets the income tax and the
choice of education is still distorted by taxation.
2.1 Introduction
Mirrlees (1971) was the first to analyze the income taxation problem allowing a general
tax function and considering a continuum of agents that differ in their innate ability to
produce output. Since this ability is private information, the government must create
a distortion in labor supply in order to do some redistribution. The optimal tax policy
results from the optimal trade-off between efficiency and income redistribution. Later
work by Mirrlees (1986) extends his analysis to include a vector of decision variables
and multiple individual attributes. In the model analyzed in this chapter there are two
decision variables for individuals (choice of hours worked and level of education), but
only one-dimensional heterogeneity, which means it is a particular case of the setup
analyzed by Mirrlees. The contribution of this model is thus to highlight the particular
implications that Mirrlees' results have in the presence of observable education.
The interaction between education and redistributive policy was first analyzed by
Hare and Ulph (1979), but they ignore the choice of labor when education is observ-
able, so in their model first best is achievable. Broadway, Marceau and Marchand
(1996) focus on the time inconsistency of the optimal policy when education is en-
dogenous but unobservable. Diamond and Mirrlees (2003) show that the presence
of endogenous education need not make it optimal to reduce income taxation if the
income derivative of education is high enough. Brett and Weymark (2003) look at
what the optimal income tax looks like in a context where education is fully subsi-
dized. Gottlieb and Moreira (2003) focus on the regressivity of educational subsidies
(since children from wealthier families tend to receive more education than those from
poor families). Costa and Maestri (2004) analyze interactions between income tax
and education in a context where all individuals are identical at the time of their
educational choice and their type is only revealed afterwards. Kapicka (2004) looks
at what optimal income tax looks like in a dynamic model with (unobservable) hu-
man capital; using a model with individual heterogeneity (building on the Mirrlees
model), he finds that in the long run human capital makes less redistribution optimal;
he also runs some numerical simulations for the US economy that suggest that, in the
presence of human capital, optimal tax rates will be 10-16% lower.
This chapter derives the optimal tax schedule in the presence of observable educa-
tion choices (and unobservable labor). It is common in the income taxation literature
to assume labor (or its cost for individuals) is not observable, even though hours of
work could conceivably be observed if the planner so desired to do. One first reason is
that hours of work do not necessarily reflect effort, as the vast contracting literature
on providing adequate incentives at the firm level shows. If not even the employer
can observe the actual input, then it must be even harder for the government. Fur-
thermore, even if effort is observable at the firm level, if taxes are diminishing in the
number of hours worked, this provides an incentive for workers to stay additional
hours on the job doing private tasks that might otherwise be done more efficiently at
home.
Education, on the other hand, might be more easily measured. One major reason
is that a large part of its cost is indeed monetary and easily measurable. Furthermore,
this cost is a priori the same for all individuals. Naturally one might imagine that
some people have a smaller cost of learning, but even if it is relevant it might be offset
by being strongly correlated with higher foregone wages, which in turn increase the
cost of education.
Ii is also assumed that agents have full information about their type and make
their education and labor choices for a given tax schedule, which is contingent on
the level of education and labor income. All agents are assumed to have zero initial
wealth, so all inequality comes from different ability levels. Furthermore, there is an
implicit assumption that agents can freely borrow against future wealth and have the
same discount rate as the government.
Under these conditions, if the disutility of labor is not significantly affected by
other variables in the utility function (namely, if the level of income and education
does not affect the disutility of labor) then it is optimal not to distort the choice
of education. This can be achieved by giving an educational subsidy that offsets
the distortion that income tax has on the choice of education. On the other hand,
if for a higher level of education (or income) the cost of labor increases, then the
direct subsidy on education should be lower (or even negative in very extreme cases).
Finally, it might be optimal give a subsidy to education that is even larger than the
tax on income if either education or wealth make labor time more agreeable.
Independent work by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) finds similar conclusions to
this chapter.
2.2 The model
Agents have a utility function U(y, e, 1) over net income y, the level of education
e and labor supply 1. Utility is non-decreasing and concave in x = (y, -e 2 -1 2 ). It
needs to be more concave than it is usual to assume since the production function will
exhibit increasing returns to scale, which need to be offset to guarantee the problem
can be solved using a first order approach. Assume also that the following inada
conditions hold: Uy(O,e, l) = co, U~,(oo,e, l) = 0, Ue (y, 0, 1) = 0, Ue (y, 00,1 ) = - 00,
U (y, e, 0) = 0 and U (y, e, oo) = - oo. This function is defined for non negative
values of y, e and 1.
Consider a static decision problem where agents choose education and labor in
the same period as they consume. This formulation can be seen as a reduced form of
a dynamic problem where the agent maximizes lifetime utility.
Individuals can have different types that are characterized by their ability 0, which
is distributed between 0 and 9 with cdf F(O) and pdf f (0).
Each individual can choose a level of education (measured in years of schooling)
which enhances productivity proportionately to individuals' initial ability. Further-
more, each agent's education only influences his own productivity (so there is no
externality of education on the overall productivity of the economy), so that labor
income for a given agent is given by
w = 9el.
This complementarity between education and ability is crucial for the results of
this paper, but it seems to be a reasonable one. With complementarity between
ability and education it will be more productive for relatively higher types to invest
in education. Regev (2005) argues that one possible reason why lower ability workers
might benefit more from acquiring education is that they have a lower cost of foregone
earnings. Even though this possibility is allowed by this model (by allowing education
to crowd out labor in the utility function), it does not change the results. Furthermore,
productivity does not have to depend linearly on education. All the results follow
through if we replace e by a strictly increasing function of education O(e) such that
labor income would now be given w = 0O(e)l (as long as the concavity assumptions
for the utility function as changed accordingly to ensure that the problem remains
convex).
The government maximizes a social welfare function given by
W = fo G(u(O))dF(O)
and has to finance unproductive expenditures in the amount E. For this, it can
use taxes which are potentially a non-linear function of observable labor income and
education: T(w, e). The government budget constraint is thus given by
j T(wo, ee)dF(O) > E.
The net income available for agent's consumption is given by total income minus
taxes
y = w- T(w,e).
In addition to its budget constraint, the government also has to consider the
incentive compatibility conditions for the agents in order to guarantee that they do
not want to imitate another type
U(Oeolo - T(Oeelo, eo), e0, loe)
> U(9'eod, loi- T(O'eoleo,eo,),eo,,-, - )
for all 0 and 0'.
Since this condition is not very manageable, replace it for the first order condition
of the consumer's problem.
Given the assumptions of the model, the first order conditions characterize the
optimal decision for the agents when taxes are zero. However, this may not be the
case for the optimal tax schedule since its functional form is endogenous, which may
lead to a non-convex budget set when marginal income tax rates are declining. This
chapter will abstract from this problem and continue the analysis using first order
conditions, which can be written as
U [01 [1 - T,(Oel,e)]- Te(el, e)]+ Ue = 0
UyO9e [1-T,,(Oel,e)] + Uz = 0.
Using these conditions as a constraint for the planner's problem, we can derive the
first order conditions for the social optimum. These conditions are a particular case
of the optimality conditions for the problem studied by Mirrlees (1986) for non-linear
taxation in a one-dimensional population'. The simplified conditions are
T = -o A, where A = 1 + lo- + Oeele- •
1 - T, OIL U O u
UeAB 2 UjeTe =Tw UA-B whereB =10le + o12
UT A Ue Ue
If Uie and Uly are small then Te a Tw . If we replace this expression in the
wUYI
consumer's first order condition for the choice of education, we get UyOloe + Ue 2 0
which means that the education choice will not be distorted by taxes. Note that
this does not mean that the level of education will be the same as if there were no
taxes since taxes reduce labor supply, which in turn reduces the benefit of education,
making it optimal to invest less in it.
However, it is possible that these cross derivatives are not negligible. In the next
section we see what happens if education crowds out work hours.
2.2.1 Time Cost of Education
Assume that utility is quasi-linear. This particular case was studied by Diamond
(1998) so it will give us a useful benchmark for our results.
1For a direct derivation see the appendix. ao is the multiplier on the agent's incentive compati-
bility constraint and 0Lo is the multiplier on the constraint that determines the level of utility a given
type attains given the amount of taxes it pays.
Utility is now linear in income, but there is a convex cost of spending time either
acquiring education or working. We can think of the cost of education as being the
opportunity cost of the time that could have been spent working
U(y, e, 1) = y - v(e + 1).
Since the labor and education are substitutes in the utility function, this means
that whenever education is higher, this will not only increase the marginal disutility
of education, but also the marginal disutility of labor.
In this case, the first order conditions for the consumer's problem become
01[1 - T,(0el, e)] = v'(e+ 1) +Te(Oel,e)
Oe [1 - T,(0el, e)] = v'(e + 1).
The optimality conditions for the allocations are
f(O)p[Olo
f(O)p[Oeo
Using the fact that
consumer's first order
optimal tax schedule
0o = f(o)[p-G'(u(0))]
- v'(eo + lo)] = 0v"(eo +le)0
-v'(eo + lo)] = Uole V'(eo + l0) + v"(,eo + l)]. -
a(O) = 0, we can find a(0) by integrating u'(0) and using the
conditions to recover the tax rates, we can characterize the
T _ fe (p -G')dF 1 -F
1 - T, p(1 - F) Of '
v'T,Te =
The first expression characterizes the optimal income tax schedule2 and replicates
the result of Diamond (1998) for a given level of education, which suggests that the
2 -1 + •- 1 ,where eF is the elasticity of labor supply which is given by -j = v'/(v"l).
presence of endogenous education does not influence optimal income taxes (except by
changing the underlying education level).
Up until now we have been talking about gross taxes on income and education,
which are given by T. and Te, respectively. Let us now consider the net tax on
education, which I will define as the direct gross tax on education plus the tax levied
on education through income taxes and which is given by T e+OIT.,,. Plugging into the
consumer's first order condition, we can see that the net tax on education actually
gives us the direct distortion that taxes have on the choice of education, which is
given by 01 - v'.
Proposition 4 With time cost of education the optimal net tax on education is pos-
itive.
To see this replace the optimal education tax into the consumer's first order con-
dition for education to get
Oy 
_ T-/T77 >
v' 1 - T.
Since the left hand side is increasing in the level of education, this will distort
education downwards. This happens because by reducing the amount of education
we can reduce the distortion in labor supply, since more education makes labor more
expensive.
Note that despite the fact that net taxes on education are positive, the optimal
gross tax on education is actually negative (which means there is an education sub-
sidy); it is just not large enough to offset the taxation levied on education through
income taxes.
2.2.2 Monetary Cost of Education
Assume now that utility is still quasi-linear, but it is additively separable in education
and labor in the following way
U(y, e, 1) = y - c(e) - v(l).
In this formulation, we can interpret c(e) as a monetary cost of education that
does not affect utility in any way other than reducing the amount of income available
for consumption.
The first order conditions for the consumer's problem are now given by
01 [1 - T,(Oey, e)]
Ge [1 - T,(Oey, e)]
= Te(Oey, e) + c'(e)
= v'(l).
The optimality conditions for the allocations are
07 = f(0)[p-G'(u(O))]
01o0
f(O)p[Oeeo- v'(lo)]
= c'(eo)
= 0 [ + v"(10)]
and the optimal tax schedule is given by
TW fo (p - G')dF 1 - F
1 -- T- p(1- F) Of
Te = -c'TW.
As in the case with time cost of education, the first expression characterizes the
optimal income tax schedule and is identical to the expression reached by Diamond
(1998).
Proposition 5 With monetary cost of education the optimal net tax on education is
zero.
To see this, replace the optimal education tax into the consumer's first order
condition for education to get
Oy = c',
which means that it is optimal not to distort the choice of education since for each
type, we are subsidizing the cost of education at the same marginal rate at which
we are marginally taxing labor income. At first this result may seem odd since it
seems that a perturbation of education around its first best level would have only a
negligible effect on utility while allowing us to keep more subsidy money, but this is
not not the case because the reduction in education would also lead to a decrease in
collected taxes (since we would be in a region where the marginal cost of education is
lower that the marginal benefit, then paying T' of that cost as an education subsidy
and receiving T' of the benefit as taxes would actually increase government revenue).
Proposition 6 In the model with monetary cost of education the optimal solution is
the same for a generic function T(w, e) or for a function that depends only on income
net of educational expenses t(w - c(e)) as long as w - c(e) is strictly increasing in 0.
It is trivial to go from the particular functional form to the more general case, so
the proof focuses on the opposite direction.
Choose t'(w(0)-c(e(0))) = T,(w(0), e(O)). We can do this since w-c(e) is strictly
increasing in 0. Note that = -c't' = -c'T, = Te for this particular formulation ofde
the utility function. This is a crucial condition for this proof to work because unless
this is true we will not be able to match the consumer's first order conditions.
Set t(w(_) - c(e(_))) = T(w(_), e(O)).
Furthermore, define r(O) - T(w(9), e(O)) and ?(9) = t(w(9) - c(e(O))). Note
that r'(O) = Tw' + Tee' = Tww' - c'Twe' = t'(w' - ce') = ?'(0). Since we defined
r(_) = r'(_), this implies that r(9) = ?(9) for every 0, which is the same as saying
that t(w(9)-c(e(O))) = T(w(O), e(0)) (note that this does not mean that t(w-c(e)) =
T(w, e) in general).
But now it is clear to see that the allocation chosen by consumers will be the
same in both cases since both the first order conditions and the budget constraint
are the same. Furthermore, the government will be able to collect exactly the same
amount of taxes, which means that we can reach the best allocation using a generic
tax function that depends on labor income and education even if we restrict ourselves
to a tax function that depends only on labor income net of educational expenses.
2.2.3 Time and Monetary Cost of Education
Assume now that utility remains quasi-linear, but has both a time and a monetary
cost associated to education
U(y, e, 1) = y - c(e) - v(e + 1).
This case combines the previous two and the optimal tax schedule can now be
written as
T_ f (p - G')dF 1 - F
1-T - p(1-F) Of i
I'T
Te= -c'T v'T
In this case, it is optimal to subsidize the monetary cost of education at the same
rate as we are taxing income and subsidize the time cost at a lower rate. Thus, as long
as the time cost component is relevant the net tax on education will remain positive.
2.3 Comparing Different Models of Education
So far it has been assumed that education choice is observable by the social planner.
This section analyzes what happens to the results of the model if we change this
assumption.
It starts by assuming that education is not observable, but is still affected by the
income tax, so that the social planner can take this additional distortionary margin
into account when deciding on the optimal income tax schedule. Although the case
with unobservable education has already been studied in the literature, it is useful to
rederive it under my previous setup in order to be able to pinpoint the fundamental
differences between the two cases more easily.
Next, the equilibrium is derived for an economy where education is still affected
by income taxes, but the planner does not take this effect into account when choosing
the income taxes. In this setup, the planner takes the distribution of ability after
education is chosen as given and chooses the income tax optimally for that distribution
without considering that the choice of education is actually endogenous.
The section finishes with a simulation of the distributions of skills for the US
economy following the procedure of Diamond (1998) and then giving a rough estimate
of what optimal taxes might look like under the three alternative models.
Note that there is a trivial welfare ordering between these three models. The
economy with observable education achieves (weakly) higher welfare than the econ-
omy with unobservable education (since the social planner can always choose a tax
schedule that is independent of education if it is optimal to do so). Furthermore, if
education is unobservable, the economy where the planner is aware of the effect of in-
come taxes on education always has a (weakly) higher welfare than the economy with
the myopic planner since the allocation in the later economy can always be achieved
by choosing the same income tax schedule as the myopic planner would.
Throughout this section it is assumed that the utility function is quasi-linear and
additively separable in labor and education
U(y, e,1) = y - c(e) - v(1).
2.3.1 Unobservable Education
If education is not observable, the tax function can no longer be contingent on educa-
tion, which means it can only depend on each individual's observed level of income:
T(w). The first order conditions for the consumer's choice now become
01 [1 - T,(Oey)] = c(e)
Qe [1 - T,(Oey)] = v'(1).
These restrictions on the planner's problem can be written as the following enve-
lope conditions
u'(9) = v'(1))lo/0
u'(0) = c'(e)eO,
where u(O) = eole1 - T(Oeolo) - c(eo) - v(lo).
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
H = f(O){G(u(O)) + p[Oeolo - u(O) - c(eo) - v(lo)]} + ov'(l)1 + c'(ee)eo
9 9
and the optimality conditions for the allocations are
oa + poI = f(O)[p- G'(u(O))]
f(O)p[9lo - c'(eo)] = poeo[c'(ee) + c"(eo)]/O
co
=aoeo[• + v"(lo)]/9.
f(O)p[Oeo- v'(lo)] = l[v'(l) v"(lo)]/0.le
Plugging in the consumer's first order conditions, we can find the optimal tax
schedule3 which is given by
T_ fo((p - G') dF 1 - F qil7e
1-Tw p(1-F) Of q1 +Ie
Remember that when education was observable (or when there was no endogenous
choice of education) the last term on this equation was 7p instead of ,l-, which means771 +,qe
that it is smaller (at least for the same values of 1) when we have an endogenous non-
observable choice of education which makes income taxes more distortionary, thus
making it optimal to reduce income taxes. Of course this is only a partial analysis
since the overall effect also has to account for the equilibrium effect in the remaining
variables.
331 is the same as before and 17e - 1 + e'1,where ee is the elasticity of education which is given
by E = c'/(c"e).
2.3.2 Myopic Social Planner
Let us now consider the case when the planner only looks at the distribution of
total ability after education is chosen. In this setup it does not make sense to have
observable education, since this would reveal initial ability, which would make the
problem uninteresting. Thus, the tax function still depends only on observed income.
When the social planner takes education as given even though it is endogenous,
the consumer's first order conditions that determine the choice of labor and education
are still given by
01 [1 - T,(9ey)]
Ge [1 - T,(Oey)]
= c'(e)
= v'(1).
However, the planner only takes the second condition into account when choosing
its tax schedule. As before, this second condition can be written as
u'(o) = v'(lo)lo/O,
where u(O) = Oeolo - T(Oeolo) - c(eo) - v(lo).
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
v'(lo) lo
H = f(O){G(u(O)) + p [Oeolo - u(O) - c(eo) - v(leo)]j} + o 1)
0and the optimality conditions for the allocations are
and the optimality conditions for the allocations are
f()p[o- 0'(lo)]
f (0)p[Oee - v'(l0)]
= f(O)[p- G'(u(O))]
= U v'(lo)
= coalol--l +±v"(lo)]/O.
Plugging in the consumer's first order conditions, we can find the optimal tax
schedule which is given by
T_ f (p - G')dF 1 - F
1 - Tw p(1 - F) O-f '
Note that this expression is exactly the same as in the case when education is
observable, but there is no additional subsidy on education to offset the distortion
caused by income taxes.
2.3.3 Simulation of Optimal Taxes for Different Models of
Education
Following the procedure used in Diamond (1998) to get a rough idea of the skill
distribution in the US, this section uses the 2003 CPS data available through IPUMS-
CPS to calculate an implied average wage dividing yearly wages by weeks worked and
typical hours per week. Earners of both sexes are considered, as long as their average
hourly wage is above $1 and individuals usually worked more than ten hours per week
on more than ten weeks per year. The log of wage is regressed on an age polynomial,
gender, marital status and education4 and then take the log of residuals to be my
ability component. The resulting distribution is plotted below.
The relative ability of individuals is represented in the horizontal axes of Figure
2-1, with 1.0 being the average ability. We can see that the density peaks at about
75% of the mean ability. To better analyze the tail behavior of the distribution, we
must find out how the ratio [1- F(9)]/f(0) evolves, which is shown in Figure 2. As is
the case in Diamond (1998), we can see that [1 - F(9)]/9f (0) stays roughly constant
above the mean ability, which is consistent with a Pareto distribution.
Given this distribution of skills, we can now simulate what the optimal tax sched-
4 Standard OLS is used to estimate the impact of education on hourly wage, which is arguably not
the best procedure since the choice of education is itself affected by initial ability, which would bias
the estimate upward. Many studies using instrumental variables have however not found smaller
effects, which seems to suggest that both estimates are biased upward (see Card (2001) for a compar-
ative analysis of different studies). On the other hand, we are only measuring quantity of education
and not quality, which might understate its effect.
Using different coefficients for education or leaving it alltogether out of the regression did not
change the features of the estimated distribution of abilities.
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Figure 2-1: Estimated Density and Cumulative Distribution of Abilities
ule might look like. Note that this is not meant to be an exact policy prescription for
what the income tax should be, since some additional non-trivial assumptions need
to be made. Assume a constant elasticity of labor supply equal to e, = 0.5. Likewise,
for education assume 6e = 0.5. The social welfare function is G(U) = UI-/(1 - a),
with a = 2 and the government needs to collect no revenue: E = 0.
Following Diamond (1998), if we assume ability follows a Pareto distribution and
the elasticity of labor supply is constant, we can write the optimal tax for the case
when education is observable or the planner is myopic as
T_ B(9)
1- T,, a
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Figure 2-2: Estimated Ratios -() in grey and -() in blackf (0) Of(0)
where B(O) = fo(p-G')dF and a = is the coefficient of the Pareto distribution.
p(1-F) 1-F(0)
For the chosen social welfare function, G' converges to zero as ability rises without
limit, which means that B(0) will converge to one. Furthermore, Figure 2-2 seems to
suggest that that a is approximately 3 above the mean ability and for an elasticity
of labor supply of 0.5 we have rp = 3, which means that optimal T, will converge to
approximately 0.5s.
If education is unobservable, optimal taxes under a Pareto distribution and con-
stant et and e will instead be given by
T._ _ B(O) (0i) e
1-T. a q7 + ?7e'
5For a sensitivity analysis as to how the optimal asymptotic tax rate varies with different para-
menter, see Diamond (1998).
.~j.
which means that now optimal taxes will converge to approximately 0.33.
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Figure 2-3: Estimated Optimal Tax Schedule
Figure 2-3 plots the simulated optimal tax schedules under the three different
assumptions for education. The optimal tax for very low values of ability is not
reported, since the estimate for these values is probably less accurate since obser-
vations with very low wages were dropped and did not consider people who chose
not to worker were not considered. Such a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of
this paper. For very high levels of ability, the tax schedule will continue to rise until
we reach the limit tax rates calculated above. However, the estimated series gets
significantly noisier since the number of observations with very high ability is very
low.
As mentioned before, the existence of unobservable education will tend to make
........... PP-- "00
tax rates lower, since there are additional distortions arising from taxation6 . This is
indeed the case in our simulation. In the graph below we can see that taxes are at
their lowest when education is unobservable. When education is observable, taxes are
at their highest, but the choice of education is not affected by them since education
is being subsidized at the same rate, which means that even though taxes are very
high, they are not as distortionary as they would be if education was not observable.
Finally, in the case where the planner ignores the effect of taxes on education,
taxes are higher than when unobservable education is taken into account exactly
because this distortion is not considered and lower than when education is observable
because individuals did not invest as much in education which means that society
will be poorer, which decreases the B(O) component of the tax schedule.
At this point it is useful to take stock and compare our results to those of Kapika
(2004). He finds that taking the distortion of taxes on education into account should
significantly reduce taxes in the US. Our findings indeed support this conclusion if we
believe that we are switching from a tax system that totally ignores taxation effects on
education to one that takes them into account, but cannot observe education choices.
However, if we can switch to a system where education is observable, then income
taxes should instead go up and additional subsidies to education should be provided.
2.3.4 Actual Taxes in the US
Using the same CPS data as before, the expected wage and the expected tax rate7
were computed for any given individual given his schooling level. This gives us an
idea of what the optimal marginal subsidy rate should be for each level of schooling
under the monetary cost of education model.
It is important to emphasize again that the model does not take into consideration
any redistribution from children of rich parents to children of poor parents. The model
6This need not be the case in a more general model. Diamond and Mirrlees (2002) provide an
example where adding an additional distortive decision varable need not reduce optimal taxes if in-
come effects are strong enough. Even in this quasi-linear model it is not clear that with unobservable
education taxes will be lower for all types.
7These tax rates refer to single individuals.
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Figure 2-4: Expected Wages and Taxes for each Schooling Level
implicitly assumes zero initial endowment for everyone and perfect credit markets.
It does not take intergenerational redistribution issues into consideration. Also, this
analysis focuses only on the level of education achieved, and not on its quality. Finally,
if income tax rates are not set optimally, then in general it will not be optimal to set
marginal subsidies on education equal to marginal income taxes. For these reasons,
these numbers should be taken as the direct application of a stylized model and not
as a policy recommendation.
Another interesting feature of the US tax system is that the marginal tax rate is
increasing (displaying a similar pattern to the one simulated in Figure 3) and reaches
its maximum at 35%. Given that the distribution of skills seems to follow a Pareto
distribution with parameter a = 3, we can now find the elasticity of labor substitution
for which this asymptotic tax is optimal according to the following expression
Tq B(0) = ' a - 1.62,1 - TW
which for our usual assumption that G' converges to zero gives us an implied elasticity
of labor supply of 1.63, which seems to be too high. To get a more reasonable value of
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around 0.5 we would need B(0) to be almost 0.5, which means that the government
cares a lot about high earners. Another possibility is that education is actually not
totally observable.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
The model proposed in this chapter suggests that if education is observable, then
its monetary costs should be subsidized at the same marginal rate as we are taxing
the income of individuals in each ability level. Non-monetary costs should also be
subsidized, but it is not clear exactly to what extent.
For these results to hold it is crucial that the cost of education is observable (or
at least mostly so) and that ability and education are complements, although the
particular functional form for the production function may vary.
Although full flexibility of the tax function is allowed, the results seem to suggest
that there is a relatively simple way to operationalize them (at least regarding mone-
tary costs), which is to allow educational expenses to be deducted from future income
(for example, by allowing tax deductible student loan payments). Current US income
taxes allow tuition and fees to be deducted from current income (or from parents'
income) and allow student loan interest deduction. Although this measure is clearly a
subsidy on education, it is not clear that the its form is the best. For example, if a self
financed student with no income at time of education gets funding through a student
loan, the subsidy is receives is probably suboptimal, since he only gets deduction on
his interest payments. On the other hand, children from parents with a high income
will receive a high subsidy on education even if they end up paying a low marginal
tax due to lower ability. However, a more complete discussion of these issues would
have to incorporate the effects of inherited wealth, which are outside the scope of this
paper.
Another issue is that the people at the bottom of the distribution are not the ones
receiving the maximum marginal subsidy for education. As in the original Mirrlees
model, marginal tax rates at the bottom of the distribution are zero, which means
that the marginal subsidy will also be quite low for the lowest types. This seems
to be in strong conflict with the common view that people should have the same
opportunities and that education is crucial in providing that. One answer might be
that in this model being at the bottom of the distribution has nothing to do with
low initial wealth that might prevent people from getting education, but is rather
related to having such low ability that investment in education has very low return.
Also, our results do not mean that everyone should not be getting a minimum level
of education. How this education should be financed is indeterminate, though. The
lowest type will in general receive a negative tax, but it can be paid either as an
income transfer or free education up to a certain level.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Derivation of the Optimal Tax First-Order Conditions
Assuming that the first order conditions for the consumer's problem fully characterize
their optimal choice, we can write the government's problem as
max J G(U(0eolo - T(0eolo, ee),eo,lo)) f(O)dO
subject to E = T(Oeleo, eo) f(O)dO
Ue = -Uy[4l [1 - T,,(Oey, e)] - Te(Oey, e)]
U, = -Uoe [1 - T,(9Oey, e)].
We will now make the following change of variables
t(O) = T(Oeolo, eo) with
Utl(
u(O) = U(Oeolo - t(O), eo, lo) and u'(0) = Uyeolo [1 - Tw] = ,
which means we can write the government's problem as
0
max j G(u(o)) f(O)dO
0
subject to E = t(0) f (0)dO
u(o) = U(Oeolo - t(o), eo, le)
-u'(0) = U(9eOolo - t(o), eo, l1)lo/0.
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
0-010H = f(O){G(u(O)) + pt(0)} + - Ut(Oeelo
-Po{u(O) - U(Oeelo - t(O), co, l0)}
and the first order conditions are given by
t o = Iio- f(0)G'(u(0))
p f(0)pf(O)
po[oeoUy + UQ]
1 o[91O0U + Ue]
= UoU + U0U
= + U11 + OeoU,]
0 1 0
_ a'l [Ue + OloUiy].0
Plugging in the consumer's first order conditions, we can rewrite these expressions
aso- A,O/Lo
0o
-- B,
Op o
where A =
where B =
Uu Utu
1 + lo-e + Oeolo iU, U,
10le + 912 Li1Ue 0 Ue
Using these expressions we can solve for Te as a function of T,
Ue A - BLiA-BTe = TW
WUi A
- t(o), eo, l1)
TW1- T
TW
I-Tm1 - TW)
Te Uy
Ue(l -Tw)

Chapter 3
Taxation of Entrepreneurial
Capital in a Deterministic Setting
This chapter considers a Ramsey model of linear taxation for an economy with capital
and two kinds of labor. If the government can only observe the joint return of capital
and entrepreneurial labor, then there will be positive capital income taxation, even
in the long run. This happens because the only way to tax entrepreneurial labor is
by also taxing capital. An example shows conditions under which the labor tax is
higher than the capital tax.
3.1 Introduction
In a Ramsey economy with capital and one type of labor, Chamley (1986) shows that
it is optimal not to use capital taxation in the long run, so that only labor taxes are
used to finance government spending. The reason for this is that since labor will bear
the full incidence of both taxes, it is more efficient not to use capital taxation, which
also distorts the intertemporal wedge, as well as the intratemporal decision between
consumption and leisure.
An interesting departure from this framework is the case where there are two types
of labor in an economy. Optimal capital taxes will in general not be zero in the long
run if one labor input is not taxable (Correia 1996) or both kinds of labor have to
be taxed at the same rate (Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi 1997). However, the sign of
the optimal capital tax remains ambiguous and strongly depends on functional form
assumptions.
This chapter also considers a model with two types of labor, but assumes that one
kind of labor, which can be interpreted as entrepreneurial labor, has to be taxed at
the same rate as capital. Under these conditions, the optimal plan will have positive
capital taxes in the long run. The intuition for this result is that the government would
like to tax both kinds of labor and not tax capital in the long run. However, since
the only way to tax entrepreneurial labor is by also taxing capital, the government
will choose to use capital taxation, so that it can tax entrepreneurial labor.
This deterministic model allows us to capture one reason why the existence of
unobservable entrepreneurial labor may lead to positive capital taxation in the long
run. A more complete study of entrepreneurial investment will also need to take into
account the uncertainty that characterizes these activities, and possible insurance
mechanisms to overcome it. For a reference on these issues, see Albanesi (2006), who
finds a different mechanism for capital taxation, which might be positive or negative,
depending on whether higher capital tightens or loosens the incentive compatibility
for the entrepreneur's effort.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the model and describes
the optimality conditions for agents in the economy. Section 3.3 derives the optimal
plan for the benevolent government, which entails positive capital taxation in the
long run. Section 3.4 shows an example with sufficient conditions for capital taxes
to be positive, but lower than labor taxes. Section 3.5 concludes. The appendix in
section 3.6 derives a baseline model where both kinds of labor income can be taxed
at different rates, as well as some extensions of the model with one type of labor.
3.2 Model Setup
When entrepreneurs work in their own business, it is hard to disentangle which part
of the firm's profits is due to their effort, and which is a pure return on capital. Thus,
the government may not be able to charge different tax rates for the return on capital
and entrepreneurial labor.
This section sets up a model of linear Ramsey taxation when there is one capital
good and two labor inputs. The return from one of the labor inputs cannot be
observed separately from the return on capital, which means that they are subject to
the same tax rate. This labor input can be interpreted as entrepreneurial labor. The
other labor input is fully observable and is subject to a labor tax. The government
is benevolent and needs to collect revenue to finance public spending of g in every
period.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of measure one of identical households who derive utility from
consumption ct, observable labor it, and entrepreneurial labor nt. They discount the
future at rate 3, so that each household's lifetime utility is given by
00
t=0
Assume for simplicity that the utility function takes the following form
C1-a 11+a n1+7
u(c, 1, n) = C- with a, a, 7 > 0.
o-r 1+a +7
Households can spend their income in consumption goods, or they can save using
capital kt or government bonds bt. Let qt be the price of a bond that pays one unit
of consumption good tomorrow. Households receive income from their labor and
from their investment in capital and bonds. Let (1 - rt)wl be the after tax return
on observable labor. Entrepreneurial labor income wn and capital income rt are
subject to the same tax rate ~rk. Given this, the households face the following budget
constraint every period
ct + kt+l + qtbt+l1 = (1 - rt)w'lt + (1 - +tk)(wnt  rtkt) + bt,
as well as a no-ponzi condition that guarantees that households cannot roll over their
debt forever.
Households maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint. The solution
to this problem is given by the first order conditions for consumer optimality.
The intertemporal conditions for consumption and capital accumulation are
Uc,t+1 ktuc,t = t = rt+i(1 - +)./3u•,,+l qt
The intratemporal conditions for consumption and the two kinds of labor are
un,t = wt(1 
_ .k) and u ,• = wt(1 - 1
c,t Ti Uc,t
Together with the budget constraint, these conditions fully characterize the solu-
tion to the households' problem.
Notice that the same tax rate tk that determines the distortion in the entrepreneurial
labor choice also controls the wedge in capital accumulation. As we will see in the
next section, this will imply that the government cannot choose different distortions
for these two margins, which will lead to positive capital taxation in the long run.
3.2.2 Firms and Market Clearing
Each period firms maximize profits given the before taxes prices for capital rt and
the labor inputs wt and wt. They have access to the production function F(kt, It, nt),
which has constant returns to scale and is concave. Furthermore, assume Fkz > 0 for
x = n, 1, so that increasing capital never decreases the productivity of either type of
labor. Market clearing implies that factor prices must equal the marginal productivity
of each factor
rt = Fk,t w• = Fnt w. =
The resource constraint for the economy must also be met every period
ct + g + kt+1 = F(kt, lt, nt).
3.3 Optimal Plan
Given the households' budget constraint and the resource constraint, market clearing
conditions ensure that the government's budget constraint is always met, which means
we do not need to take it explicitly into account. Furthermore, following Lucas and
Stokey (1983), we can simplify the households' budget constraint using the optimality
conditions for households and firms, and rewrite the budget constraint as the following
implementability condition
00
Z, tm(ct, nt, lt) = u,(co, no, lo) [Fk(ko, no, lo)(1 - ro )ko + bol - Wo
t=0
with m(c, n, 1) = uec + unn + ull.
In general, if an allocation meets the implementability condition and the resource
constraint, it can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium for certain prices and
taxes. However, for this problem, since the tax on entrepreneurial labor is the same
as the tax on capital, we also need to impose the following observability condition to
make sure that the same capital tax satisfies the households' optimality conditions
for capital and entrepreneurial labor
u,,t+,/Fk,t+1 + uc,tFn,t+l = 0.
For the initial period, the observability condition is given by
Mo - Un,o + Uc,oFn,o(1 - 70k) = 0.
The benevolent planner thus maximizes the welfare of a representative consumer
subject to the implementability condition (associated to multiplier y), the resource
constraint for every period (associated with multiplier 6tpt), and observability condi-
tion (associated with multiplier 3t7yt+ 1). The Lagrangean for this problem is
u(ct, nt, lt) - yt+1[un,t+1,3 Fk,t+1 + uc,tFn,t+l]+
Am(ct, nt, lt) - pt [ct + gt + kt+1 - F(kt, nt, lt)]
/-two -0MO
The first order condition for consumption for t > 1 is given by
U4,t + umc,t - Pt = 7Yt+1Uc,tFn,t+l.
The first order condition for entrepreneurial labor for t > 1 is
n,t + mn,t + p+tFn,t 7- -1 (unn,tIFk,t + Un,t/3Fkn,t + Uc,t-1Fnn,t).
And the first order condition for capital for t > 1 is
Pt - Pt+1)3Fk,t+1 -=7t+1(Un,t+1 Fkk,t+1 + Uc,tFnk,t+1) .
We can now show that in steady state there will be positive capital taxation. To
see this, we will start by showing that, in any steady state, yt cannot be zero, and
both yt and pt must be constant. Under these conditions, the first order condition
for capital accumulation implies that there must be positive capital taxation in the
long run.
To see that in steady state, yt cannot be zero, assume there is a steady state with
7t = 0. Then the planner's first order condition for consumption implies that Pt must
be constant since pt = p = uc + imc. Given this, the first order condition for capital
implies that 3Fk = 1. If this is the case, then the observability condition can only be
met if
Fn Un
UOn the other and, with c = 0, the planner's first order conditions for consump-
On the other hand, with -yt = 0, the planner's first order conditions for consump-
L=
L= Et
t=O
tion and entrepreneurial labor imply that
Un + im Un 1 + iP(1 - U) UnF n -- - --
uc + pnc 4 1 + P(1 +,q) Uc
Thus - cannot be zero in steady state since this would entail taxing capital at a
different rate from entrepreneurial labor, which is not allowed in this model.
Let us now check that, in steady state, yt and Pt must be constant. To see this,
solve for Pt and Pt+l as a function of -Yt+l using first order conditions for consumption
and labor in the following way
Pt(-yt+l) = uc + pmc - "t+luccFn
Pt+1(-Yt+1) = [7yt+l(UnnOFk + unFkn + ucFnn)/f - Un- imn]/Fn-
Plug into first order condition for capital
Pt(Yt+l) - Pt+1(Yt+1)3Fk= -Yt+(/Un/Fkk + UcFk)-
We will get an equation that is linear in "Yt+l and thus uniquely defines -yt+l, which
implies that in steady state both yt and Pt must be constant.
Since 't must be constant and positive in steady state, the planner's first order
condition for capital together with the households' first order condition for capital
implies that there will be a positive capital tax as long as uno3Fkk + ucFnk > 0. Using
the observability condition, this condition can be rewritten as
oF k Fkk > 0
Fn Fk
which, given our assumption for the production function, will always be met.
3.4 An Example
In the previous section we have seen that if entrepreneurial labor must be taxed at
the same rate as capital, then it is optimal to have positive capital taxation in the
long run, so that entrepreneurial capital can bear some of the tax burden. However,
using this kind of taxation leads to an undesirable distortion of the intertemporal
wegde. Thus, although capital taxes are positive, they will tend to be smaller than if
they were a pure tax on entrepreneurial labor.
The example that follows shows conditions under which the tax on both kinds of
labor income would be the same if they were both observed separately from capital
income, but if entrepreneurial labor income is observed jointly with capital income,
then it will be taxed at a positive rate, but lower than that on observable labor. The
reason for this is that since the capital tax is creating an additional distortion on
capital accumulation, then it will be optimal for it to be smaller than if it was a pure
tax on entrepreneurial labor.
Assume that a = 7, so that both kinds of labor have the same elasticity of
substitution. Assume also that the production function is given by
F(k, 1, n) = kO(1 + n) 1- " with 0 < 0 < 1.
Take the planner's first order condition for entrepreneurial labor and devide it by
un,t to get the following expression
1 + (14+ +) = m rUnn' Fk,t + AnUn,t Un,t
where A _ un,t-tFkn,t + tuc,t-1Fnn,t/ - PtFn,t
For observable labor, the first order condition can be written as
Al
1+ A(1 + 77) = -)Ul't
where A' - us,t•ytFkl,t + ytuc,t-lFnl,t/P - ptFl,t.
Given the assumption that the two types of labor are perfect substitutes in pro-
duction, it follows that A n = A' = A. Thus, it must be the case Un,t < ul,t since
U, A + y7tunn,tFk,t A Ul
1 + PO( + r) 1 + p(1 + r/)
Since wu7 = wi= wt, the households's optimality conditions for labor imply that
the capital tax is always lower than the labor tax
Un,t Ul,t1-T = --Wtuct = l I.
1- rtk 1-
1 - r Un,t
The reason for this is that in this case the government would like to set the same
tax for both kinds of labor. However, since taxing entrepreneurial labor also taxes
capital, it is optimal to reduce this kind of taxation relative to pure labor taxation.
If the government would like to initially tax entrepreneurial labor at different
rates, then the optimal capital tax will be higher than the labor tax if the following
condition is met
AUt - YtUnn,tFk,t A Ut
1u+'= l+p(1+rq) 1 + y(1+a)
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In general, if labor and capital taxes are available, the government will use only labor
taxation in the long run. The reason for this is that the full incidence of the capital
tax is on labor since the intertemporal rate of return is pinned down by the discount
rate. Furthermore, capital taxes also distort the intertemporal margin, which means
that labor taxes are the most efficient way to collect revenue. However, if there are
two types of labor, one of which must face the same tax as capital, then the only way
to tax it is by using capital taxation. In this case, the incidence of the capital tax is
no longer the same as that of the pure labor tax, which means that it is optimal to
use both kinds of taxation.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Optimal Taxation with Two Taxable Labor Inputs
If different taxes are allowed for capital income and entrepreneurial labor income,
then the optimal plan no longer needs to meet the constraint
un,t+lf3Fk,t+1 + uc,tFn,t+l = 0.
The new Lagrangean for this problem is
00
L = E Pt {u(ct, nt, lt) + ym(ct, nt, l1) - pt [ct + gt + kt+l - F(kt, nt, l)]} - iWo.
t=O
This means that the optimality conditions will be the same as before, but with
the multiplier 7-y set equal to zero, so that for our functional form, the optimal tax on
capital is zero and taxes for both kinds of labor are given by
1 n 1 + A(1 - o)
1++ rL(1 + 7)
1 1 + Y(1 - or)1+T 1 = l+p(l--a)
1 + p(1 + a)
Thus, the Chamley (1986) holds with two kinds of labor as long as they can be
taxed separately.
3.6.2 Optimal Taxation with One Untaxable Labor Input
The Chamley (1986) model had one labor input nf that was subject to a linear tax.
Consider instead that labor cannot be taxed.
The utility function is now given by
C1-a nl+
u(c, n) = 1- with , > 0.
1-U 1+71
The production function F(k, n) is increasing, concave, and exhibits constant
returns to scale in capital and labor.
The implementability condition can be derived as in the model with two labor
inputs and is given by 00
E !3m(ct, I1) = Wo.
t=o
If the labor input cannot be taxed, then the following observability constraint
needs to be met
Un,t + Wtuc,t = 0.
The planner maximizes utility subject to the implementability condition, the ob-
servability constraint, and the new resource constraint, so that Lagrangean for the
planner's problem is given by
0 u(ct, nt) + ,m(ct, nt)- 7t [un,t + Fn,tUc,t]
t=o -pt [ct + gt + kt+1 - F(kt, nt)]
The first order condition for consumption for t > 1 is given by
Uc,t + [Lmc,t - Pt = 7tFn,tucc,t.
The first order condition for labor for t > 1 is
Un,t + Pmn,t + PtFn,t = Yt(unn,t + Fnn,tuc,t)-
And the first order condition for capital for t > 1 is
Pt - Pt+1•3Fk,t+l = -7Yt+1Fnk,t+1Uc,t+1-
As before, in steady state, the multiplier -y has to be positive, otherwise there
would be positive capital taxation, which is not allowed in this model. Thus, the
capital tax cannot be zero. Furthermore, since Fk > 01, the capital tax must be
strictly positive and will be given by
1-- -k = 1 with /Fk = 1 + 2Fnku,.OFk P
Notice that this result is very similar to that of Correia (1996), where there was
one untaxable labor input. Here, the untaxable labor input is the only one, which
means that its cross derivative with capital in the production function is unambigously
signed, which leads to the conclusion that there must be positive capital taxation in
the long run.
3.6.3 Optimal Joint Capital and Labor Tax
Assume now that the is one labor input that must be taxed at the same rate as
capital. Then, as in the model with entrepreneurial labor, the following condition
must be imposed
u,,t++,Fk,t+1 + uF,t+l = 0.
The Lagrangean for this problem is
00 u(ct, nt) - 7t+l [un,t+1 3 Fk,t+1 + Uc,tFn,t+1]+ 7 0 MOL = Eot 
-Wo- --.
t=o Ipm(ct, nt) - pt [ct + gt + kt+l - F(kt, nt)]
The first order condition for consumption for t > 1 is given by
Uc,t + •mc,t - Pt = Yt+1Uc,tFn,t+1-
1Note that now that there are only two production factors we do not need to assume this. Since
the production function is concave and has constant returns to scale, it must be the case that
Fnk > 0.
The first order condition for labor for t > 1 is
Un,t + pmn,t + ptFn, = ~ (Unn,tFk,t~ + Un,t,3Fkn,t + uc,~t-lFnn,t).
And the first order condition for capital for t > 1 is
pA - pt+1)3Fk,t+l = -'t+1(Un,t+1l3 Fkk,t+1 + uc,tFnk,t+1).
As in the model with entrepreneurial capital, the multiplier 7- cannot be zero in
the long run, which means that if there is a unique income tax rate, then capital will
be taxed in the long run.

Chapter 4
Optimal Taxation with
Unobservable Investment in
Human Capital
This chapter considers a Ramsey model of linear taxation where the government
cannot distinguish between human capital and labor income. In this context, if
individual investment in human capital is unobservable, then it is optimal to tax
human capital at a positive rate, even in the long run. This is true even if consumption
taxes are available. Whether physical capital should taxed depends on its degree of
complementarity with human capital versus raw labor.
4.1 Introduction
In a Ramsey linear taxation model, if the government is allowed to tax both labor and
capital income, then in the long run it is optimal to converge to zero taxes on capital
income and collect all revenue through labor taxes (Chamley 1986). However, in
reality, labor income also includes a large component of human capital, which means
that human capital will be taxed in the long run if labor taxes are positive.
Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) and Judd (1999) show that if the government
can distinguish between pure consumption and human capital investment, then it
can use this information to offset the distortion that labor taxation causes on human
capital accumulation. Under this condition, it is optimal not to distort either human
or physical capital accumulation in the long run.
This chapter assumes that the government cannot distinguish between final con-
sumption and expenditures on human capital. If this is the case, then human capital
will in general be taxed in the long run, even if consumption taxes are available. Phys-
ical capital may be taxed or subsidized, depending on its degree of complementarity
with human capital relative to raw labor.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 presents a model of optimal taxation
in an economy with human capital and endogenous growth, which is a simplified
version of the model in Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997). Section 4.2 introduces the
assumption that human capital expenditures cannot be observed separately from final
consumption and derives the optimal tax scheme under these conditions. Section 4.3
concludes. The appendix in section 4.4 introduces an economy without endogenous
growth, and finds that the previous results are not sensitive to this assumption.
4.2 Benchmark Model
This section presents a model of human capital taxation which is a simplified version
of the model in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997). The government can use capital
and labor income linear taxation Tk and ri, as well as differentiated consumption
taxes on final consumption Tc and human capital expenditures -_h to finance a given
amount of spending in the public good g every period.
4.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of measure one of identical households who derive utility from
consumption ct and labor nt. Per period utility u(ct, nf) is increasing in consumption
and decreasing in labor and globally concave. Households discount the future at rate
3, so that their lifetime utility is given by
00E ' (t nt).
t=0
Households have to meet their intertemporal budget constraint
00
Ept ct(1 + Tc) + kt+ 1 + ht+1 (1 + th) - rt(1 - Tk)kt - wt(1 - t)lt] = pobo.
t=0
In this very stylized economy human capital accumulation is done simply by con-
suming some amount of final goods, and there is no labor component in human capital,
as well as no depreciation. Depreciation could be added without changing the nature
of our results, so this is done for notational simplicity. Assuming that there is no
labor cost allows us to focus on the pure investment component of human capital,
given that the results in Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) hold regardless of whether
labor is needed to produce human capital. Likewise, physical capital only requires
investment of final goods.
Households spend their income in consumption goods, as well as in physical and
human capital for the next period kt+1 and ht+l. Households receive income from
capital and effective labor It, which results from the combination of human capital
and raw labor according to it = htnt. The initial level of government debt that is held
by households is given by b0 and the (before taxes) price of consumption in period t
is Pt.
Households maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint. Given that
this problem is concave, the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for
optimality of the households' choice.
The optimality condition for physical capital accumulation is given by
rt+(1 k Pt A Uc,t 1+ -TtC+l
- PiTi+l) = +t+1 3uc,t+1 1  7tc
The optimality condition for human capital accumulation is given by
Pt1 
- Tl+ 1wt+1nt+1 t
Pt+1 1 + Thr"
Finally, the optimality condition for the labor and consumption choice is
1- r
Un,t = -u,,twtht 1 +1 + re
Together with the budget constraint, these conditions fully characterize the house-
holds' behavior.
4.2.2 Firms and Market Clearing
Each period firms maximize profits given the (before taxes) prices for labor wt and
capital rt. They have access to the production function F(kt, lt), which has constant
returns to scale and decreasing marginal productivity of capital and effective labor.
Market clearing implies that factor prices must equal the marginal productivity of
each factor
wt = F,(kt, l1)
rt = Fk (kt, 1t).
The resource constraint for the economy must also be met every period
ct + g + kt+1 + ht+l = F(kt, lt).
4.2.3 Optimal Plan
Given the households' budget constraint and the resource constraint, market clearing
conditions ensure that the government's budget constraint is always met, which means
we do not need to take it explicitly into account. Furthermore, following Lucas and
Stokey (1983), we can simplify the households' budget constraint using the optimality
conditions for households and firms, and write it as the following implementability
condition
OO
EO'c(r, Uo [Fk,o (1 - 7-0k)ko + Fi,0(1 - To)lo + bo] - Wo.
t=o + T
To see this, note that using the first order conditions for household optimality we
can show that the following equalities must hold
00
EPt[kt+l - rt(1 - ,tk)kt] = poro(1 - ,Tok)ko
t=0
00
EPt[ht+l(1 + 7t) - wt(1 - t)1t] = powo(1 -- ro)lo
t=O
00 1+• •
EPt[ct(1 +htc)] = Po uO E tctUt -
t=0 uc,0 t=0
Given this, it is straightforward to see that
equivalent to the implementability condition.
the households' budget constraint is
Any allocation that meets both the implementability condition and the resource
constraint can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium in this economy since
there exist, prices and taxes that guarantee that the optimality conditions for the
households and firms are met. Thus, a benevolent government will maximize social
welfare subject to those two constraints
00
max E Z t u(ct, nt)
t=0
subject to ct + g + kt+1 + ht+1 = F(kt, lt)
00
Stctuct = Wo.
t=0
Let y be the multiplier on the implementability condition and let 3tpt be the
multiplier on the resource constraint in period t. Then the optimality conditions for
ct, nt, kt, and ht, for t > 1, are given by
uc,t + pI(uc,t + ctuc,t) = Pt
un,t + pctUcn,t = -PtF 1 ,tht
Pt+1IFk,t+l = Pt
pt+i/F 1,t+lnt = Pt.
In steady state p will be constant, which means that neither physical nor human
capital accumulation will be distorted. However, the intratemporal wedge between
labor and consumption will in general be distorted as we can see in the expression
below
1 - Tn  un 1 + P(1 + CUcc/UC)
1 + rc ucwh 1 + Mcun/u "
Notice that there are multiple taxes that implement this allocation, since there
is one additional degree of freedom when we are choosing the taxes that meet the
optimality conditions. As Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) point out, one possibility
is to have zero capital and labor taxes, as well as zero tax on human capital invest-
ments. Consumption taxes may be zero for specific functional forms, but will be
(strictly) positive as long as utility is separable between labor and consumption and
the coefficient of risk aversion is (strictly) higher than one.
Another possible tax scheme that implements the optimal solution to this problem
would be to have zero consumption and capital taxes, together with a positive labor
tax and a subsidy on human capital expenditures.
From now on, assume that the utility function takes the following form
c1-a 1+y
u(c,n)= 1- l+ with a > 1.1 --a -1 + -1
4.3 Unobservable Investment in Human Capital
To implement the optimal solution with observable investment in human capital,
we had one degree of freedom in choosing taxes, which translates into the fact that
any of the available tax rates thh, 4t, _, tk+l could be set to an arbitrary value,
and the optimal policy could still be implemented by choosing the remaining taxes
appropriately. This is true not only in steady state, but also along a transition path.
This might lead us to think that introducing an additional constraint on what the
values of these taxes can take will not change the optimal solution, but this will not
be the case.
If human capital investments cannot be observed separately from final consump-
tion, then we cannot tax these two kinds of expenditure at different rates, which
implies that Tth = 4t. Under this additional restriction, the household optimality
conditions for human capital accumulation and labor become
= # 1-uc,t-1 = &ntwt 1-rt-
Uc,t 1 + rt
Unt = htwt 
-
Uc,t I +Tt
In order to guarantee that the same ratio (1 - rt)/(1 + tc) satisfies the two condi-
tions, the planner's problem must now incorporate an additional restriction into its
problem
/3ntun,t + htuc,t-1 = 0.
Incorporating this additional restriction associated to multiplier 3rtt, the La-
grangean for the planner's problem becomes
L = z u(ct, nt) + Actuc,t - 6t[ 3ntun,t + htuc,t-1] 
- WL = ot t 1 - A Wo
t=o -pt[ct + g + kt+~1 + ht+1 - F(kt, It)]
The first order conditions for this problem are
Uc,t + p/(Uc,t + ctucc,t) - Pt = 6t+lht+lucc,t
Un,t + ptF1,tht = 6t(u3n,t + 3ntunn,t)
pt+13 Fk,t+1 - Pt = 0
pt+l3Fl,t+lnt - Pt = 6 t+XUc,t.
The multiplier Jt will remain positive, even in steady state. If this was not the
case, then the labor wedge would be different from the human capital wedge. To see
this, notice that with 5 = 0, the optimality condition for labor in steady state would
be
Un = l+p(l-a) < 1,ucFlh
whereas the wedge for human capital accumulation would be given by
1 1=1
which clearly violates the constraint associated with J.
In steady state p must be constant and the choice of physical capital will remain
undistorted. However, this will no longer be the case for human capital, since 3 > 0.
With constant consumption taxes, optimal taxes will be given by
k- Ti 1 --r I1- rk =land i = < 1.
1+ -c 1 + -h
From the previous section, when differential taxes were allowed on final consump-
tion and investment expenditures, optimal taxes were instead given by
1 -7 1 1 -- 
t1
1 - k = =+ 1 and < 1.
1 + 7h  1 + rc
When human capital expenditures were observable, it was optimal not to tax
either type of capital in the long run and only tax labor. If they are not observable,
the tax on human capital must be the same as the tax on labor, and will be positive,
even in the long run.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
If the government cannot distinguish between final consumption and human capital
expenditures, then it is optimal to tax both labor and human capital in the long run.
Whether physical capital should be taxed or subsidized depends on its complemen-
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tarity with human capital versus raw labor. This is true even if consumption taxes
are allowed.
Our results differ from those in Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) and Judd (1999),
who find that human capital should not be taxed in the long run. The reason for this
is that they assume that human capital expenditures are observable, which allows the
government to subsidize them, and thus choose a different wedge for the intratemporal
labor-consumption decision and the intertemporal human capital decision.
4.5 Appendix
So far we have assumed that the production function F(kt, lt) has constant returns to
capital and effective labor. Furthermore, since effective labor was given by lt = htnt,
the production function had globally increasing returns to scale. Assume now that
effective labor is actually a CRS function of human capital and raw labor given
by lt = f(ht, nt), so that the production function F(kt, f(ht, nt)) exhibits constant
returns to scale in all production factors. Assume f is increasing and concave.
The new implementability condition is given by
00
Z/3t(ct + ntU.,t) = Wo.
t=O
As before, if the government cannot distinguish between final consumption and
human capital investment, it has to meet the following constraint
3fh,tun,t + fn,tUc,t-1 = 0.
The Lagrangean for the planner's problem is now given by
L u(cf, nt) + A[cgu,t + n•Un,t] - t[ 3 fh,tun, + nUt-11
t=o I -pt[cet + g + kt+1 + ht+1 - F(kt, f (ht, nt))]
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The first order conditions for this problem are
Uc,t + I(Uc,t + ctucc,t) - Pt = Jt+1fn,t+1Ucc,t
un, + A(un,t + ntUnn,t) + ptFi,tfn,t = Jt [Pfh,tunn,t + fhna,tun,t + fntuc,t-1]
Pt+1/3 Fk,t+1 - Pt = 6t+l[fhk,t+1Un,t+l + fnk,t+1Uc,t]
Pt+l0F1,t+lfh,t+1 - Pt = 6 t+1[Pfhh,t+lUn,t+l + fnh,t+1Uc,t-].
We will now interpret these conditions with and without observable investment in
human capital.
4.5.1 Observable Investment in Human Capital
When the government can observe investment in human capital the constraint asso-
ciated with 6 does not have to be met, which means that its multiplier is always zero.
Given this, it is straightforward to see from the first order conditions for the optimal
plan that neither type of capital should be distorted in the long run. On the other
hand, the wedge between labor and consumption will remain distorted in the long
run even if we do not impose that a > 1 since now taxes will be given by
1 -r 1 + (1 - a)
-- < 1.
1+7rc 1+/a(1 +y)
Thus, in this economy, if we choose consumption taxes to be zero, we can imple-
ment the optimal long run solution using zero capital taxes, positive labor taxes, and
a subsidy on human capital expenditures that exactly offsets the distortion caused
by the labor taxes on human capital accumulation.
Furthermore, notice that for this utility function, labor taxes are constant starting
in period one, and capital taxes are zero starting in period two, so that there is no
initial accumulation of assets that allows the government to sustain zero capital taxes
in the long run. The same was true in the case of increasing returns to scale.
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4.5.2 Unobservable Investment in Human Capital
As before, if human capital is unobservable, then it will be optimal to distort the
human capital wedge in the long run, which must be the same as the intratemporal
wedge between labor and consumption.
The optimal long run taxes on human capital (assuming zero consumption taxes)
can be written as
6 [fnh _fhh1- = /3Ffh - 1= -ucfn[ 7 f].
The tax on human capital is always positive since fnh > 0 and fhh < 0.
Physical capital will not be taxed since the relative productivity of human capital
and labor does not depend on the capital level
1_k -= /Fk - 1 = 0.
4.5.3 Taxation of Physical Capital
So far we have assumed that the production function can be written as F(kt, f(ht, nt)),
which assumes that the level of capital does not influence the relative productivity of
human capital and labor. Assume now instead that the production function is given
by G(kt, ht, nt), which has constant returns to scale with respect to the three factors
of production. Firms can observe the contribution of each individual factor, so that
equilibrium factor prices are given by
k = Gk,t Th = Gh,t r7 = Gnt.
With constant returns to scale in the production function, the households' budget
constraint becomes
00
pt [ct(1 + -r) + kt+1 + (1 + vth)ht+l - (1 - qtk)rkk - - - rti)(r"nt + rhht)] = pobo.
t=O
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As in the previous section, the implementability condition is given by
00
E /3t (ctuc,t + ntun,t) - WO,
t=O
and the following constraint has to be met if the government cannot distinguish
between final consumption and human capital investment
/Gh,tUn,t + Gn,tUc,t-1 = 0.
The Lagrangean for the planner's problem is now given by
00 u(ct, nt) + A[ctuc,t + ntun,t] - Jt[,3Gh,tUn,t + Gn,tuc,t-11L= E ++ AWo0 .
t=o -pt[ct + g + kt+l + ht+l - G(kt, ht, nt)]
Under this conditions, the first order condition for capital accumulation becomes
Pt+lfGk,t+1 - pt = 6t+1[3Ghk,t+1Un,t+1 + Gnk,t+1uc,t],
which means that when investment in human capital is not observable and 6 is posi-
tive, the steady state level of capital taxes (assuming zero consumption taxes) is given
by
Tk 6 Gnk Ghk
Tk = /Gk- 1= -ucG[n n ].
- p GG
Thus, whether physical capital is taxed or subsidized depends on the relative
magnitude of Gnk/Gn versus Ghk/Gh.
The reason for this is that since the constraint associated with 6 is preventing
labor taxes from being set optimally, it is optimal to also use capital taxation to
reduce this distortion. This mechanism is similar to that in Correia (1996), where
there were two kinds of labor, one of which could not be taxed (which means that its
tax could not be set optimally), thus creating a reason for capital taxation, even in
the long run.
For the case where the production function can be written as G(kt, ht, nt) =
104
F(kt, f(ht , nt)), the two effects exactly offset each other, so that it is optimal to have
zero physical capital taxes in the long run.
105
106
Bibliography
[1] ABREU, D. (1988) "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discount-
ing," Econometrica, 56, 383-397.
[2] ABREU, D., D. PEARCE, AND E. STACHETTI (1990) "Towards a Theory of Dis-
counted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Econometrica, 58, 1041-
1064.
[3] ACEMOGLU, D., M. GOLOSOV, AND A. TSYVINSKI (2006) "Markets versus
Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms," mimeo.
[4] AGUIAR, M., M. AMADOR, AND G. GOPINATH (2006) "Efficient Expropria-
tion: Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy" mimeo.
[5] AIYAGARI, R., A. MARCET, T. SARGENT, AND J. SEPPALA (2002) "Optimal
Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Journal of Political Economy, 110,
1220-1254.
[6] ALBANESI, S. (2006) "Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital with Private
Information," NBER working paper.
[7] AzzIMoNTI-RENZO, M., P. SARTE, AND J. SOARES (2006) "Optimal Policy
and (the lack of) Time Inconsistency: Insights from Simple Models," mimeo.
[8] BANKS, J. P. DIAMOND, AND J. MIRRLEES (2007) "The Base for Direct Tax-
ation," Mirrlees Report, draft.
[9] BENHABIB, J. AND A. RUSTICHINI (1997) "Optimal Taxes without Commit-
ment," Journal of Economic Theory, 77, 231-259.
107
[101 BENVENISTE, L. AND J. SCHEINKMAN (1979) "On the Differentiability of the
Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics," Econometrica, 47, 727-732.
[11] BOVENBERG, A AND B. JACOBS (2005) "Redistribution and Education are
Siamese Twins" Journal of Public Economics 89.
[12] BRETT AND WEYMARK (2003) "Financing Education using Optimal Redistribu-
tive Taxation" Journal of Public Economics 87.
[13] BROADWAY, MARCEAU AND MARCHAND (1996) "Investment in Education and
the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy" Economica, New Series,
Vol. 63, No. 250.
[14] CARD, D. (2001) "Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Progress on Some
Persistent Econometric Problems", Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 5.
[15] CHAMLEY, C. (1986) "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilib-
rium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, 54, 607-622.
[16] CHARI, V.V. AND P. KEHOE (1990) "Sustainable Plans," The Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 98, 783-802.
[17] CHARI, V.V. AND P. KEHOE (1993a) "Sustainable Plans and Debt," The Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 61, 230-261.
[18] CHARI, V.V. AND P. KEHOE (1993b) "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default,"
The Journal of Economic Studies, 60, 175-195.
[19] CORREIA, I. (1996) "Should Capital Income be Taxed in the Steady State?,"
Journal of Public Economics, 60, 147-151.
[20] COSTA, C. AND L. MAESTRI (2004) "The Risk Properties of Human Capital
and the Design of Government Policies".
[21] DIAMOND, P. (1989) "Optimal Income Taxation: an example with a U-shaped
pattern of Optimal Marginal Taxes" The American Economic Review, Vol. 88,
No. 1.
108
[22] DIAMOND, P. AND J. MIRRLEES (2002) "Optimal Taxation and the Le Chate-
lier Principle" MIT working paper.
[23] DOMINGUEZ, B. (2006) "Public Debt and Optimal Taxes without Commit-
ment," forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory.
[24] FERNANDEZ-VILLAVERDE, J. AND A. TSYVINSKY (2002) "Optimal Fiscal Pol-
icy in a Business Cycle Model without Commitment," mimeo.
[25] GOTTLIEB AND MOREIRA (2003) "Should educational policies be regressive?".
[26] GROCHULSKI AND PISKORSKI (2005) "Optimal Wealth Taxes with Risky Hu-
man Capital" Federal Reserve of Richmond WP, No. 05-13.
[27] HARE AND ULPH (1979) "On Education and Distribution" The Journal of Po-
litical Economy, Vol. 87, No. 5, Part 2.
[28] JONES, L., MANUELLI, R., AND P. RossI (1993) "Optimal Taxation in models
of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, 101, 485-517.
[29] JONES, L., MANUELLI, R., AND P. RossI (1997) "On the Optimal Taxation
of Capital Income," Journal of Economic Theory, 73, 93-117.
[30] JUDD, K. (1985) "Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Foresight Model," Journal
of Public Economics, 28, 59-83.
[31] KAPICKA, M. (2006) "Optimal Income Taxation with Human Capital Accumu-
lation and Limited Recordkeeping," Review of Economic Dynamics, 9, 612639.
[32] KYDLAND, F. AND E. PRESCOTT (1977) "Rules rather the Discretion: The
inconsistency of Optimal Plans" Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-491.
[33] KLEIN, P. AND J. RIOS-RULL (2003) "Time-Consistent Optimal Fiscal Policy,"
International Economic Review, 44, 1217-1246.
[34] KLEIN, P., P. KRUSELL, AND J. RIOS-RULL (2004) "Time-Consistent Public
Expenditures," CEPR Discussion Paper 4582.
109
[35] KLEIN, P., V. QUADRINI, AND J. RIOS-RULL (2005) "Optimal time-consistent
taxation with international mobility of capital," mimeo.
[36] KLEIN, P., P. KRUSELL, AND J. RIOS-RULL (2006) "Time-Consistent Public
Policy," mimeo.
[37] KOCHERLAKOTA, N. (1996) "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without
Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, 63, 595-609.
[38] LJUNGQVIST, L. AND T. SARGENT (2004) Recursive Macroeconomic Theory,
2nd edition.
[39] LUCAS, R., JR. AND N. STOKEY (1983) "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy
in an Economy without Capital" Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 55-93.
[40] LUCAS, R., JR. AND N. STOKEY WITH E. PRESCOTT (1989) Recursive Meth-
ods in Economic Dynamics.
[41] MARCET, A. AND R. MARIMON (1992) "Communication, Commitment, and
Growth," Journal of Economic Theory, 58, 219-249.
[42] MIRRLEES, J. (1971) "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Tax-
ation" The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2.
[43] MIRRLEES, J. (1986) "The Theory of Optimal Taxation" Handbook of Math-
ematical Economics, edited by K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intrilligator, Vol. III, ch.
24.
[44] PLELAN, C. AND E. STACCHETTI (2001) "Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey
Tax Model," Econometrica, 69, 1491-1518.
[45] RAY, D. (2002) "Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Econometrica,
70, 547-582.
[46] WERNING, I. (2003) "Standard Dynamic Programming for Aiyagari, Marcet,
Sargent and Seppala," Lecture Note.
110
